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ABSTRACT 
 
Citizens are born, but they are also made. How its citizens come to 
be—whether the educations they receive will expand or constrain their 
future options, whether the values they assimilate will encourage or 
dissuade their civic engagement, etc.—fundamentally concerns the 
state. Through the power it wields over a vast range of policymaking 
contexts, the state can significantly influence (or designate those who 
will influence) many of the formative experiences of young citizens. 
Young citizens’ accumulated experiences in turn can significantly 
influence the future mature citizens they will become. The state 
insufficiently considers the cumulative nature of its citizens’ 
development, however. Discrete spheres of policy- or law-making may be 
internally consistent, but they lack consistency when combined over time 
and across a range of contexts—which is the way in which developing 
citizens experience them. As a result of this discontinuity, the state at 
best squanders opportunities to more effectively advance its ends with 
respect to immature citizens; and at worst, fails to meet its most basic 
obligations to them. 
This Article develops a framework to guide the decisions that affect 
the young across a range of law and policy contexts, providing 
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consistency and a coherence that will better serve those citizens and 
further the state’s ends. It grounds the framework in the core values and 
ends of the liberal democratic state, which dictate the state’s most basic 
obligations to its citizens, and its requirements of them. It accounts for 
the interests and constitutional rights of both parents and children. To 
better understand how these might change as the young develop to 
maturity, it reviews the processes of cognitive development, drawing on 
research from a range of disciplines within developmental science. This 
review examines developing capacities, ongoing deficiencies, and the 
effects of external influences on development. It then integrates these 
theoretical, constitutional, political, and developmental considerations 
into a framework comprising the ends toward which decisions affecting 
the young should aim: (1) guaranteeing parents’ liberty to form and 
raise a family; (2) denying anyone absolute authority over the 
immature, while transferring to the immature themselves authority in 
realms where they have reliably attained decision-making maturity; (3) 
ensuring that young citizens will attain maturity with their 
entitlement to life-deciding liberty intact; and (4) ensuring that young 
citizens will attain maturity having acquired the capacities to fulfill 
the basic obligations of citizenship. 
To begin illustrating the framework’s potential effects, the Article 
proposes a set of policies consistent with it. For infancy and early 
childhood, it proposes minimizing interference in parenting. For 
adolescence, it endorses obligatory, out-of-home education. It more 
generally proposes that decision makers identify contexts in which young 
citizens can make competent self-regarding decisions. The Article 
argues that by mid-adolescence, these include making health care 
decisions and voting. It also argues for changes to policies in other 
contexts where young citizens’ decision making is likely to remain 
compromised, even into young adulthood, including driving and 
combat. 
Because the scope of policymaking affecting the young is so vast, 
future projects will carry forward and expand upon the policymaking 
implications of the framework set out here. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The liberal democratic state is its citizens. And citizens are born, 
but they are also made. How its citizens come to be—whether the 
educations they receive will expand or constrain their future options, 
whether the values they assimilate will encourage or dissuade their 
civic engagement, etc.—fundamentally concerns the state. Through 
the power it wields over a vast range of policymaking contexts, the 
state can significantly influence (or designate those who will 
influence) many of the formative experiences of young citizens. 
Young citizens’ accumulated experiences in turn can significantly 
influence the future mature citizens they will become. The state 
insufficiently considers the cumulative nature of its citizens’ 
development, however. Discrete spheres of policy- or law-making 
may be internally consistent, but they lack consistency when 
combined over time and across a range of contexts—which is the 
way in which developing citizens experience them. As a result of this 
discontinuity, the state at best squanders opportunities to more 
effectively advance its ends with respect to immature citizens; and at 
worst, fails to meet its most basic obligations to them. 
Consider one example: Parents of children enrolled in a public 
elementary school want them excused from reading a textbook that 
promotes values contrary to their religious beliefs. The state board of 
education refuses to accommodate them, since the readings do not 
compel the children to act or profess any belief. The parents then 
remove their children from the school system altogether, opting to 
continue their education in a more cloistered environment of 
dubious academic rigor. Assume the school’s refusal was lawful, as 
the Sixth Circuit in Mozert v. Hawkins in fact held such a refusal to 
be.1 The decision whether to accommodate the children therefore 
rested within the state’s policymaking discretion. Despite its being 
lawful and justifiable on administrative efficiency and other grounds, 
however, did the state’s decision further its ultimate ends with 
respect to its developing citizens? Did it even consider these? What 
would an approach that considers and accounts for such ends look 
like? 
 
 1. Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988). See also discussion infra Part V.D.1. 
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State actors regularly confront questions, across a wide range of 
law and policy contexts, whose resolution can profoundly affect the 
young, both during their immaturity and beyond: Should parents be 
permitted to provide the entirety of a child’s education within their 
home? Should public schools accommodate the children of parents 
like those in Mozert, who object to their children learning tolerance, 
respect for difference, and critical thinking? Should fifteen-year-olds 
make their own health care decisions? Should sixteen-year-olds drive 
motor vehicles unfettered? Or at all? Should the military have the 
power to send seventeen- and eighteen-year-olds into combat 
zones?2 
The goal of this Article is to develop means of guiding the 
myriad state decisions affecting immature citizens so that together, 
these decisions cohere into a consistent and effective set of policies. 
In pursuit of this goal, I identify and argue for a set of ends toward 
which decisions affecting the young should aim. 
To identify these ends, I examine political theories of the state, 
citizenship, and civic education; interpret constitutional doctrine that 
shapes parents’ and children’s rights; evaluate individual interests and 
significant political considerations; and, to gain a better 
understanding of the ways in which interests and rights may change 
as the young develop to maturity, survey research in cognitive 
development, including developmental cognitive and social 
neurosciences. I then consider the implications of all these and 
integrate them into a simple four-part framework. Its core comprises 
the core values of the state itself, but out of that abstract core 
emerges a structure sufficiently concrete to provide practical 
guidance to state actors. The framework also provides a normative 
measure against which state actors might assess the separate and 
combined effectiveness of their policies or decisions. 
To start with as universal a premise as possible, I begin by 
assuming only the existence of the state and its current structure as a 
liberal constitutional democracy.3 Drawing on its founding principles 
 
 2. See infra Part V.C–D. 
 3. To be clear, “liberal” here refers not to the progressive ideology of the left-leaning 
faction of the Democratic Party. It instead refers more broadly, and loosely, to the political 
philosophy that served as the country’s founding principle and thus includes the core political 
commitments of most of its citizens—“that all men are created equal,” that among their 
inalienable rights is the right to “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness,” and that 
governments are instituted “to secure these rights, . . . deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed.” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). The 
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and the work of classical through contemporary political liberal 
theorists, it is no great leap to derive the core value of the state—
individual liberty. To be more precise, its core value is negative 
liberty, a conception of freedom as noninterference.4 It is another 
modest step to derive from its core value the primary, most basic end 
of the state—safeguarding citizens’ liberty. And since the young are 
both current and future citizens, the state must guard not only their 
current liberty, but also their future liberty. It thus must deny all 
others, including parents, the right to deprive the young either of 
their basic liberty during their immaturity, or their ability to develop 
the capacity to exercise their future liberty.5 
Safeguarding their current and future liberty is thus the state’s 
most basic end with respect to its young citizens. But this is abstract 
and does not explicitly account for the interests of both parents and 
children. So I refine the state’s ends in these ways: Because of the 
importance of their role as children’s default caregivers, because they 
value childrearing to such an extent that many consider that activity 
part of their own identities, and because they also are citizens whose 
liberty the state seeks to ensure, the state should consider and try to 
accommodate parents’ interests while working toward its young-
citizen-respecting ends.6 It should do likewise with respect to the 
interests of its young citizens—those related to their welfare (their 
well-being irrespective of their choices) as well as their autonomy 
(their interests in exercising those liberties of which they are 
capable).7 
The welfare and autonomy interests of young citizens both 
change dramatically as they mature. Their immediate and long-term 
welfare will depend in large part on external influences—education, 
environment, and experience. State decision making should take 
account of these influences on the young, since developmental 
research confirms that they can enrich or constrain development. 
State decisions should also take account of the autonomy interests of 
the young, a task complicated by the ambiguity inherent in assessing 
decision-making capacity. Insights from the science of development 
 
Constitution’s Preamble announces the document’s purpose to include “secur[ing] the 
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 4. See infra Part II.A. 
 5. See infra Part II.B. 
 6. See infra Part III. 
 7. See infra Part IV.A–B. 
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can inform these efforts as well. Research across disciplines describes 
a predictable developmental trajectory and explains many of the age- 
and context-specific aspects of young persons’ decision-making 
competence (and decision-making deficiencies). Understanding the 
basic trajectory of development therefore becomes critical. 
I derive from these refinements a more specific set of ends to 
guide decision making affecting the young. These are: (1) 
guaranteeing parents’ liberty to form and raise a family; (2) denying 
anyone absolute authority over the immature, while transferring to 
the immature themselves authority in realms where they have reliably 
attained decision-making maturity; (3) ensuring that young citizens 
will attain maturity with their entitlement to life-deciding liberty 
intact; and (4) ensuring that young citizens will attain maturity 
having acquired the capacities to fulfill the basic obligations of 
citizenship.8 
Having proposed the set of ends toward which decision making 
affecting the young should aim, I then begin considering 
implications of this approach—what sorts of decisions might the 
framework support? I commend one possible set of policies. Putting 
them forward as a set renders transparent the tradeoffs made among 
the sometimes-competing priorities of the framework. 
During infancy and early childhood, the state should interfere 
only minimally in parenting. This furthers parents’ liberty interests, 
allowing them to pass their values on to their children. It also aims 
to further young citizens’ welfare interests by improving parents’ 
commitment to childrearing. The state should nonetheless step up 
efforts to increase parents’ awareness of the importance of enriching 
young children’s early experience, in light of the overwhelming 
evidence of its positive effects on development. The sorts of 
experiences that enhance children’s development (talking, reading, 
singing to them, etc.) are well within the abilities of, and unlikely to 
be resisted by, most parents; the state’s efforts on this front should 
thus stop short of imposing mandatory obligations on them.9 
Parental deference does not, on its own, maximize children’s 
liberty. But as part of a coherent set of policies, it does. Early 
parental deference would give way to reduced parental authority in 
adolescence. Beginning in early adolescence (which developmental 
 
 8. See infra Part V.B. 
 9. See infra Part V.C. 
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scientists increasingly recognize as a second critical period of brain 
and cognitive development), the state would take more affirmative 
measures to ensure young citizens’ future liberty and capacity to 
fulfill the obligations of citizenship.10 
Chief among these more affirmative measures would be 
obligatory, out-of-home secondary education. Adolescents’ 
education would include certain minimum substantive content, with 
attendance mandatory until late adolescence (age eighteen, perhaps). 
This policy would help ensure that young citizens will reach maturity 
having gained the capacities to exercise their basic, life-deciding 
liberty and to perform the functions required of the citizenry. 
Denying parents the ability to educate their adolescent children 
entirely within the home guarantees that all citizens will be exposed 
to the life choices available to them and be reasonably able to pursue 
them. Parents would retain the ability to enroll children in privately-
run schools. Though some private schools might present concerns 
similar to those presented by homeschooling, the state is better able 
to monitor these than it is to monitor in-home education. Parents 
would retain the ability to homeschool children prior to secondary 
school, and of course, nothing would prevent their otherwise 
continuing to educate and influence their children.11 
This prescription in important respects runs counter to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder, which requires 
states to respect parents’ religiously grounded objections to their 
adolescent children’s continued formal education.12 I join others 
who have urged that, despite the bedrock nature of religious rights 
in this country, Yoder should be reconsidered. There are at least two 
justifications for this position: First, no one, not even a parent, 
should receive state-sanctioned power to unduly constrain or 
foreordain another’s future; giving parents the right to dominate 
their children’s education or deny them formal schooling altogether 
(which is, of course, in addition to the significant influence already 
wielded by parents over their children) does just that. Second, the 
argument that children will be confused or unduly influenced by 
 
 10. See infra Part V.D. 
 11. See id. 
 12. 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that the First Amendment requires that states 
exempt from school attendance requirements adolescent children whose parents’ objections to 
their continued formal education is grounded in religious belief). See discussion infra Part 
V.D.1. 
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exposure to values inconsistent with those held by their families of 
origin may hold true for younger children, but not for adolescents. 
Instead, by mid-adolescence, individuals have reached adult-like 
information-processing and logical reasoning abilities (other abilities 
continue to mature into adolescence). They thus have the same 
(imperfect) cognitive abilities as their parents to distinguish their 
“public” education from their home education and 
compartmentalize the two if/when they conflict.13 
Finally and more broadly, I urge state decision makers to identify 
to the extent possible those contexts where young citizens will have 
reliably attained competent decision-making capacities, and others 
where their decision making is most likely to be compromised. The 
state should aim to afford them decision-making authority with 
respect to the former, and constrain their authority with respect to 
the latter. This approach safeguards young citizens’ liberty, both 
current and future. Respecting their autonomy expands their current 
liberty; protecting them from their deficiencies promotes their 
current welfare and also preserves their future liberty. 
The state should, however, proceed with caution. Insights from 
developmental science can inform these decisions, but science cannot 
prescribe policy. State actors may take account of development and 
the specific autonomy interests of the young, but their decisions 
must also consider and take account of the full range of interests 
affected, including the potential negative externalities of adolescents’ 
bad choices in a given context.14 
Keeping that caution in mind, the state should endeavor to allow 
young citizens to exercise the liberties of which they are capable, 
especially in purely self-regarding contexts. In other words, in those 
contexts where they have achieved decision-making competence, 
they should correspondingly have decisional autonomy. With respect 
to those specific liberties, the young are mature; the justifications for 
denying them those liberties or permitting others to make decisions 
on their behalf thus disappear. 
In what contexts, and by what age, can it be safely said that 
adolescents have achieved decision-making competence? 
Developmental scientists have concluded that by mid-adolescence 
(around ages fifteen or sixteen), basic cognitive and information-
 
 13. See infra Part V.D.1. 
 14. See infra Part V.D.2. 
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processing abilities are mature. So long as they can make a 
considered decision, outside the presence and influence of peers, 
adolescents have the capacity for mature decision making. I suggest 
two contexts that meet these criteria and in which adolescents should 
receive decisional autonomy—health-care decision making and the 
franchise.15 
Conversely, even after adolescents have attained the cognitive 
capacities needed to make rational, considered decisions, real-world 
stressors can confound their capacities and impede their decision 
making. For example, the quality of their decision making suffers in 
situations that require adolescents to quickly assess and react to risk, 
to reason while highly stressed or in the heat of passion, to make 
decisions in unfamiliar circumstances, or to act in the presence of 
peers. The neurobiological processes that support mature decision 
making under these conditions do not fully mature until late 
adolescence or early adulthood. In addition, risk-taking and 
sensation-seeking behaviors peak in early- to mid-adolescence (ages 
fourteen to sixteen or so), then decline. Researchers are also 
beginning to understand the neurobiological bases of these 
behaviors. That adolescents’ decision-making deficiencies and risk- 
and sensation-seeking behaviors have neurobiological underpinnings 
helps explain why educational interventions, which provide 
information about the risks that attend certain behaviors, have had 
little success in changing adolescent behavior.16 
In light of their cognitive deficiencies, I propose that states more 
assertively constrain adolescents’ liberties in contexts that 
compromise their decision-making abilities, particularly where their 
bad decisions might have serious negative externalities. Driving is 
one example. Driving requires near-instant risk assessment and quick 
decisions—factors that hinder adolescent decision making. 
Adolescents’ proclivity for risk-taking compounds their decision-
making deficiencies. Indeed, traffic fatalities are the leading cause of 
death among adolescents, and their crash rates are higher than those 
of any other group. These rates worsen, moreover, in the presence of 
peers. States should thus consider imposing additional restrictions on 
adolescent driving. Many states have begun doing so. Despite efforts 
to improve their driving skills and increasing adoption of graduated 
 
 15. See infra Part V.D.3. 
 16. See infra Part IV.C.2–3. 
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licensing programs, evidence suggests that only age, not education 
or even practice, correlates with reductions in crashes and fatalities.17 
Examples of other contexts that may compromise adolescents’ 
and emerging adults’ decision making including alcohol 
consumption and certain aspects of military service. I thus briefly 
discuss possible approaches to curbing alcohol abuse. And finally, I 
question the wisdom of sending into combat the youngest adults 
who serve in the military. Young soldiers must assess risk in stressful, 
unfamiliar circumstances and make split-second decisions; mistakes 
are obviously more likely in this context than in others to lead to loss 
of life, as well as enduring trauma for the soldier himself. 
The Article proceeds as follows: 
Part II describes the state’s interests in and roles with respect to 
its citizens generally, and its immature citizens in particular. It argues 
that the state’s most basic end is citizens’ liberty, and its secondary 
end is its citizenry’s performance of those functions necessary for the 
state’s continued existence. It then extends the application of these 
ends to the young. 
Part III describes parents’ interests in and constitutional rights to 
childrearing. It notes that although the latter are a highly valued 
component of parents’ individual liberties, they receive relatively 
weak constitutional protection because of their unique—and 
illiberal—status as an entitlement in the life of another. 
Part IV describes children’s interests and constitutional rights. 
To inform this discussion with a better understanding of the course 
of development to adulthood, it surveys recent research in cognitive 
development, including developmental cognitive and social 
neuroscience. While it is important not to draw conclusions that this 
still-emerging research does not support, it is also important for state 
actors to understand and, where appropriate, account for the 
significant changes wrought by the course of development. 
Developmental scientists’ understanding of cognitive development, 
its neural underpinnings, and how these relate to children’s and 
adolescents’ decision making and behavior may help state actors 
develop policies more effective than those to date. 
Part V synthesizes from the previous three Parts a framework 
comprising the basic ends toward which state action affecting the 
young should aim. To illustrate its possibilities, it uses the framework 
 
 17. See infra Part V.D.4. 
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to make an initial set of policy recommendations, outlined above. I 
only begin addressing implications of this proposed approach; it 
remains to subsequent projects to develop and build upon the 
foundation established here. The range of policymaking decisions 
affecting young citizens is vast, and varied. By each looking to a 
shared overarching standard, state actors across this vast range help 
ensure that the cumulative influence of their decisions on immature 
but developing citizens is consistent with and furthers the state’s 
ends. 
II. THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC STATE AND ITS CITIZENS, MATURE 
AND IMMATURE 
State actors—federal and state courts, legislatures, administrative 
agencies, etc.—make countless decisions that influence immature 
citizens’ lives. These decisions can be more effective and coherent 
when decision makers take to heart the ends toward which they 
should aim. This Part identifies the most basic of the state’s ends. 
The next two Parts will refine these ends by considering and 
accounting for specific interests and rights of parents and the young, 
and the final Part synthesizes from the previous three a single 
overarching framework to guide state decision making. 
Part II.A first identifies the core value of the liberal constitutional 
democracy, settling on the value accepted by all liberals—liberty. A 
state’s values determine the ends ideally furthered by state decision 
making. The minimum ends that derive from the state’s 
commitment to liberty are simply these: (1) citizens’ basic liberty and 
(2) the collective citizenry’s performance of those functions essential 
to the state’s continued existence. The latter ensures the state’s 
ability to achieve the former and is thus secondary to it.18 
Having thus identified the minimum ends of the state, Part II.B 
next explores how the state might pursue its ends with respect to a 
particular subset of its citizenry, the immature. It concludes that the 
duality inherent in the nature of their citizenship—the immature are 
current citizens but also future mature citizens—requires from the 
state a similar duality in its approach.19 
First, as current citizens, the immature have a claim to liberty, 
even during their immaturity. Their claim imposes on the state a 
 
 18. See infra Part II.A. 
 19. See infra Part II.B. 
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corresponding duty to withhold from all others absolute, unchecked 
authority over them. Though other considerations may warrant 
delegating significant authority over the immature to parents or 
caregivers,20 the state must itself assert some residual authority or 
interest—akin to a fiduciary interest—on their behalf until the 
immature develop the capacity to exercise authority over 
themselves.21 
Second, as future mature citizens, the immature have a claim to 
their future liberty. Because their period of immaturity is critical to 
and in many ways shapes citizens’ future mature lives,22 their claim to 
future liberty imposes on the state another duty, fundamentally 
different from the first: preserving immature citizens’ future 
capacities to exercise their basic liberty. And to achieve its secondary 
end, the state should also seek to ensure their future capacities to 
perform those functions required of the citizenry. The state must 
accordingly also deny others the right to deprive immature citizens 
of their abilities to develop these future capacities.23 
Some liberals might dispute the designation of liberty as the core 
value from which this analysis should proceed. Modern liberal 
egalitarians, for example, would counter that liberalism’s core is 
more robust than “bare liberty,” and that as a result the liberal state 
has broader obligations towards its citizens.24 That may be, but it is 
beside the point. Proceeding even from what they might consider a 
too-skimpy version of liberalism—and of liberty itself—reveals 
plenty. Identifying just the bare minimum ends of the state with 
respect to its immature citizens is enough to expose the inadequacies 
of the state’s existing policies; these guarantee neither the current 
liberty nor the future capacities of immature citizens.25 
This Part identifies the bare minimum ends of the state not 
simply to provide a measure for assessing existing policies with 
respect to its immature citizens, however, these ends can also serve as 
fixed points toward which modified policies might coherently aim. 
 
 20. This Article will hereafter use the term “parent” to refer to primary caregivers 
generally. Many non-biological parents act as primary caregivers and “parent” the children for 
whom they care. The term also reflects that the state designates biological parents as the 
default caregivers of the children they conceive and bear. See infra Part V.C. 
 21. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 22. See infra Part IV.C. 
 23. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 24. See infra Part II.A. 
 25. See infra Part II.B.1–2. 
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Policies might also pursue more ambitious or broader goals, but they 
should at a minimum further these. 
The United States is a liberal constitutional democracy, and all of 
this discussion takes the nation’s current political and constitutional 
structures as given.26 It is, moreover, a sufficiently stable political 
order that to consider things as they might appear in some different 
order would be a mere academic exercise, in the pejorative sense. 
A. The State’s Core Values and Minimum Ends 
The state’s core values should determine its ends, and state actors 
should make policies and decisions that advance those ends. This 
Part identifies the core value of the liberal constitutional democratic 
state as liberty—negative liberty, in particular. From that simple core 
emerge two basic ends, or goals: (1) citizens’ liberty, which is the 
state’s minimum obligation to its citizens, and (2) its citizenry’s 
performance of the functions necessary for its continuance, which is 
its minimum requirement of them. The next Part (II.B) then argues 
that the state must begin pursuing its basic ends during citizens’ 
immaturity, else risk failure to achieve its ends generally.27 
It will be news to no one that one of the central values of the 
liberal state is liberty.28 For many liberals, liberty is the central value 
of liberalism. For others, it is part of a more complex and robust 
core. 
To “classical” liberals, individual liberty is the core value of the 
liberal state.29 Associated in the United States with political 
conservatives, classical liberals hew more closely to Lockean and 
 
 26. Political theorist Stephen Macedo notes that “‘[i]t has long been a truism that the 
American political tradition is basically a liberal tradition’ and that this tradition is the ‘basis’ of 
th[e] country’s ‘national identity.’” STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES 5–6 (1990) 
(quoting CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSERVATISM IN AMERICA: THE THANKLESS PERSUASION 67 
(1962) and SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS: THE PROMISE OF DISHARMONY 23 
(1981)). 
 27. See infra Part II.B. 
 28. John Locke, for example, asserted that individuals are naturally in “a State of perfect 
Freedom to order their Actions . . . as they think fit.” JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF 
GOVERNMENT, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960). Modern 
liberal theorists have agreed. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 44 
(Erin Kelly ed., 2001). Some refer to the concept that freedom is normatively basic as the 
“Fundamental Liberal Principle.” See, e.g., GERALD F. GAUS, JUSTIFICATORY LIBERALISM: AN 
ESSAY ON EPISTEMOLOGY AND POLITICAL THEORY 162–65 (1996). 
 29. N. SCOTT ARNOLD, IMPOSING VALUES: AN ESSAY ON LIBERALISM AND 
REGULATION 3 (2009). 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2010 2:07:23 PM 
1055 Immature Citizens and the State 
 1069 
libertarian traditions, which decry government intervention in private 
ordering.30 They view liberty and private property as closely 
intertwined; some argue that private property is essential to the 
protection of liberty,31 while others maintain that that property is 
itself a form of liberty.32 Political philosopher Friedrich Hayek’s 
writings helped spark a late twentieth-century resurgence of classical 
liberal ideas in the West,33 where leaders like Ronald Reagan and 
Margaret Thatcher gave them political voice.34 
To “modern” liberals, on the other hand, liberalism’s 
foundational commitment is the equal status and treatment of each 
person.35 John Rawls, the central figure in modern liberalism, 
advanced a theory of justice whose first principle is that “[e]ach 
person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic 
liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for 
all.”36 Modern liberals thus embrace egalitarianism and support a 
more active role for government in securing personal and political 
rights.37 The Democratic Party in the United States and the Labor 
Party in Great Britain generally seek to advance modern liberal 
egalitarian principles,38 and the existing United States regulatory 
state tends to reflect them.39 
For classical and modern liberals alike, then, individual liberty is a 
core value. But it is more than this. It is their least common 
denominator—the value which all liberals agree the liberal state must 
 
 30. PAUL KELLY, LIBERALISM 69–70 (2005). See generally IAN HARRIS, THE MIND OF 
JOHN LOCKE (1994); LOCKE, supra note 28. 
 31. E.g., Friedrich A. Hayek, Liberalism, in FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, NEW STUDIES IN 
PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 149 (1978). 
 32. E.g., HILLEL STEINER, AN ESSAY ON RIGHTS (1994). 
 33. ARNOLD, supra note 29, at 3–4. See generally FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY]; 
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944). 
 34. ARNOLD, supra note 29, at 3–4. 
 35. KELLY, supra note 30, at 4–7. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 
(2000); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
 36. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 291 (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM]. 
 37. Id. at 135–38. 
 38. ARNOLD, supra note 29, at 3. 
 39. Id. at 125–35. 
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embrace.40 For this reason, this Article settles on liberty as the state’s 
core value.41 
Even as they share a commitment to liberty, however, liberals 
have different conceptions of it; and each suggests different ends for 
state policies to pursue. In order to derive from the state’s 
commitment to liberty the ends that policies should pursue, we must 
first define the conception of liberty that operates here. Liberal 
theorists tend to embrace one of three of these conceptions.42 
The first conception of liberty is the one most commonly 
associated with liberalism—negative liberty.43 As famously described 
by Isaiah Berlin, “[p]olitical liberty in this sense is simply the area 
within which a man can act unobstructed by others.”44 Negative 
liberty is freedom from external restraint on action or compulsion to 
act. It can be boiled down to the idea of freedom as 
noninterference.45 Critics of negative liberty argue, however, that it 
elides the importance of social and community connections and 
shared goals and thus mischaracterizes the individual as an atomistic, 
self-centered being.46 
The second conception of liberty is positive liberty. Whereas 
negative liberty requires freedom from external interference, positive 
liberty requires freedom from internal weaknesses that keep one from 
acting in accordance with reason or morality.47 Proponents of 
positive liberty characterize freedom as autonomy. And autonomy 
requires self-mastery, the ability to delay short-term gratification to 
 
 40. See, e.g., HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY, supra note 33, at 257–58. 
 41. Though liberty is also the central value for classical liberals, this analysis does not 
embrace classical over modern liberal ideology; instead it merely attempts to set out from as 
universally acceptable a premise as possible. 
 42. For a more extensive discussion of the competing versions of liberty, see Samantha 
Besson & José Luis Martí, Law and Republicanism, in LEGAL REPUBLICANISM: NAT’L AND 
INT’L PERSP. 3, 14–15 (Samantha Besson & José Luis Martí eds., 2009). 
 43. KELLY, supra note 30, at 51. 
 44. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 122 
(1969). 
 45. Id.; KELLY, supra note 30, at 54. 
 46. Communitarian theorists in particular charge that the liberal preoccupation with the 
individual ignores the importance of community and the pursuit of shared values and goals. 
See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 116 (1982). For a 
response to communitarian critiques of liberalism, see MACEDO, supra note 26. 
 47. BERLIN, supra note 45, at 131. See also T.H. GREEN, LECTURES ON THE 
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION AND OTHER WRITINGS 228 (Paul Harris & John 
Morrow eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1986) (1895). 
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achieve long-term goals, and critical self-reflection.48 Some critics of 
positive liberty reject what they see as the perfectionist and 
paternalistic implications of this concept of liberty, since it empowers 
the state to impose “true” freedom on its citizens.49 Negative liberty 
theorists like Berlin counter, moreover, that freedom merely requires 
the abilities to reflect and to choose. Thus while autonomy or 
enlightenment may be important values, they are values distinct 
from—not prerequisites to—liberty.50 
The third main conception of liberty is republican liberty. 
Republican theorists generally view liberty as the absence of 
domination, which they distinguish from the absence of interference 
that defines negative liberty.51 Domination requires more than mere 
interference; it requires arbitrary interference, or the possibility of 
it.52 Whereas negative liberty theorists consider all forms of 
interference to be restrictions on personal freedom, republican 
theorists argue that certain forms of non-arbitrary interference do 
not restrict freedom at all. Thus when the people enact laws in 
furtherance of their collective interests, there is no interference with 
liberty.53 For republicans, political participation guarantees freedom. 
Critics of republican liberty respond that it is more accurate to 
acknowledge that state interference does restrict personal liberty, but 
that in some cases it does so legitimately—such as when the state 
restricts a lesser liberty in order to guarantee a greater liberty.54 
Because republican liberty and negative liberty both can allow for 
such interference, critics also contend that the republican and 
negative conceptions of liberty are effectively indistinguishable.55 
They claim that republican conception is inferior, however, because 
it tends to mask inevitable tradeoffs, obscuring that some liberties 
have been sacrificed to gain greater or more essential liberties.56 
 
 48. GREEN, supra note 47, at 228. 
 49. KELLY, supra note 30, at 55–56. Positive liberty seems to allow not only for the 
existence of universal morality and rationality, but also for paternalistic state intervention aimed 
at furthering individuals’ attainment of self-dominion. 
 50. BERLIN, supra note 44, at 131. 
 51. PHILIP PETIT, LEGAL REPUBLICANISM 287 (1997). 
 52. Id.; Besson & Martí, supra note 42, at 13–14. 
 53. Besson & Marti, Law and Liberty, in LEGAL REPUBLICANISM, supra note 51, at 39, 
53. 
 54. KELLY, supra note 30, at 56–60.  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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Of these three, negative liberty—freedom as noninterference—is 
the thinnest and arguably the most widely acceptable conception of 
liberty. Negative liberty permits individuals to define and pursue 
their own versions of freedom. Positive liberty circumscribes that 
initial choice and instead empowers the state first to define 
“authentic” freedom, then to coerce citizens into exercising it. 
Noninterference is also a simpler and more transparent conception of 
liberty than is the republican conception of non-domination. 
Consider, for example, some instance where the state interferes with 
individual liberty X to make possible the later enjoyment of a greater 
liberty Y. If the operative conception is negative liberty, the state’s 
action will constitute an interference with X—albeit an arguably 
legitimate one. The conception of liberty as the absence of 
interference logically implies the obverse—the presence of 
interference is the absence (or reduction, perhaps, depending on the 
extent of the interference) of liberty. In this way, negative liberty 
makes transparent the tradeoff involved in securing the greater 
liberty Y—sacrificing the lesser liberty X. If the operative conception 
is republican liberty, however, the state’s action would constitute 
noninterference, rather than legitimate interference with X. So 
republican liberty obscures the tradeoff involved in securing Y. For 
these reasons, and again surmising that the minimal conception will 
be the least objectionable starting point, this analysis adopts negative 
liberty as its operative conception. 
To be clear, adopting negative liberty as the core value and 
operative concept of liberty here is not the same as claiming that it 
always trumps other values, nor that interference is always a bad 
thing.57 John Locke, who championed individual liberty, understood 
that without laws and some state interference, there would be no 
liberty. He envisioned the state’s power as the aggregation of 
individuals’ powers delegated to it with the understanding that the 
state would then restrict some liberties of some individuals (e.g., 
restraining those who would wrongfully deprive others of “life, 
 
 57. One can make that argument, of course, as some libertarians do, claiming that the 
only legitimate basis for state action is preserving individual liberty. See KELLY, supra note 30, 
at 56–57. Making the argument, however, requires more than adopting a particular conceptual 
analysis of liberty. The concept of negative liberty considers state action to be interference with 
some aspect of someone’s freedom; but one who takes that view might nonetheless accept that 
some other value (e.g., equality, justice, etc.) or policy goal justifies that interference. KELLY, 
supra note 30, at 53–56. 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2010 2:07:23 PM 
1055 Immature Citizens and the State 
 1073 
health, liberty, or possessions”) in order to maximize and preserve 
the liberties of all.58 
How might the state actualize its commitment to its core 
abstract that value? The next two Parts derive from the state’s 
commitment to liberty the ends that its policies should aim to 
achieve. Part II.A.1 concludes that the state’s primary end is simply 
safeguarding its citizens’ basic liberty; this is its minimum obligation 
to its citizens. Achieving its primary end requires the state itself to be 
stable and effective. Part II.A.2 thus concludes that the state’s 
secondary end must be ensuring its continued existence, which it can 
achieve only through citizens’ participation in its functioning; this 
participation is the state’s minimum requirement of its citizenry. 
Having thus identified the state’s primary and secondary ends, 
the following Part (II.B.) next considers whether, and how, the state 
should pursue its ends with respect to its immature citizens in 
particular. 
1. The state’s minimum obligations to citizens generally 
If liberty is the state’s core value, then, at the risk of stating the 
obvious, it follows that safeguarding its citizens’ liberty must be its 
primary end. This guarantee is the state’s minimum obligation to its 
citizens. 
The conception of liberty guaranteed by the state is that of 
noninterference, or negative liberty.59 To have liberty in the negative 
sense requires the distinct personhood of the individual. In other 
words, if a person can be free from the interference of others, the 
person must have some capacity for meaningful existence separate or 
distinct from others. A person lacks that capacity if her life is wholly 
and ultimately decided by another—instead, the person effectively 
 
 58. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 144 (Henry Regnery Co. 
1955) (1689). Even when negative liberty is the ideal, government in a populous and diverse 
society must restrain some individual liberties to avoid harm to others and to safeguard the 
liberty of all. A traffic regulation may require that motorists drive only in assigned lanes on one 
side of the road, depriving them of the liberty to drive in other lanes or on sidewalks. But it 
deprives them of the lesser liberty (the liberty to drive to a destination using any part of the 
road or the sidewalk) in order to preserve the greater liberty (the liberty to drive to a 
destination). (It also preserves pedestrians’ liberty to travel by foot without losing their lives.) 
 59. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. 
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becomes an extension of the other, and her life becomes an 
expression of the other’s will.60 
The basic liberty to decide one’s ultimate life course for oneself is 
thus a minimum entitlement of the citizen in the liberal state.61 Its 
complement is the absence in every other person of a liberty to 
decide that citizen’s life course.62 The state’s liberty guarantee thus 
confers on each citizen a claim, or right, to have the state withhold 
from all other persons the right to be “other-determining.”63 
The basic liberty to decide one’s life course entails at a minimum 
choosing the social, moral, and political paths to which one will or 
will not commit. The basic liberty to decide one’s life does not, 
despite the ominous warnings of liberalism’s critics, require the 
liberal citizen to be an unmoored individual, free from external 
influence or community connection. No one leads an acontextual 
life.64 As social beings, citizens are parts of families and communities 
 
 60. The U.S. Constitution captures the same notions in its guarantee against servitude 
in the Thirteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. The Supreme Court’s definition of 
slavery is “‘the state of entire subjection of one person to the will of another.’” Hodges v. 
United States, 203 U.S. 1, 17 (1906) (quoting Webster’s Dictionary). Locke’s “natural State 
of Freedom” is the contrapositive: the capacity to act “without asking leave, or depending on 
the Will of any other Man.” LOCKE, supra note 28, at 287. 
 61. This discussion aims to keep to as plain a notion of decision making as possible. It 
avoids concepts like “autonomy,” “autarchy,” “self-determination,” etc. Political theorists and 
philosophers frequently use these terms to refer to the attainment of specific competencies or 
ideals of personhood. Macedo, for example, defines autonomy as an “ideal of character” that 
approximates the republican conception of liberty. MACEDO, supra note 26, at 216. He argues 
that true autonomy requires “the capacity critically to assess and even actively shape not simply 
one’s actions, but one’s character itself, the source of our actions.” Id. The “autarchic” person, 
on the other hand, is capable of practical reasoning and choice but fails to critically evaluate 
conventions and customs. Instead, he or she tends to adopt them uncritically. See JOHN 
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 66 (David Spitz ed., 1975); MACEDO, supra note 26, at 216. 
 62. This is the correlativity thesis advanced by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, the 
influential cataloguer of legal rights. See generally WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, Fundamental 
Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning, in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 
AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 65 (Walter Wheeler Cook 
ed., 1923). 
 63. Just as one party’s liberty correlates to another party’s absence of liberty in 
Hohfeld’s analysis of legal relations, a claim correlates to a duty. Id. See also, PAVLOS 
ELEFTHERIADIS, LEGAL RIGHTS 107–14 (2008) (discussing Hohfeld’s model of legal 
relations). The term “other-determining” here simply refers to the ability to determine or 
control the life-course of another. I avoid the term “self-determining” for reasons stated in 
supra note 62. 
 64. It is no shame to admit that John Donne put it better: “No man is an island, entire 
of itself.” JOHN DONNE, Meditation XVII, in DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS 
(1624). 
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that embrace diverse values. In a liberal democracy, this is generally 
to the good. Liberty leads to pluralism. Individuals pursue various 
commitments according to their values, sometimes congregate in 
communities with others who are like-minded, and usually endeavor 
to pass their values on to their children.65 The liberal state 
accommodates and respects the pluralism that results from liberty, 
including inherited cultural and religious values. 
But while the liberal state’s commitment to pluralism is broad, it 
is not unlimited. The state may not permit majority, community, or 
other individuals’ values to foreordain the individual citizen’s life 
course. Parents and communities may transmit their values and 
beliefs to the immature, but they may not deprive them of the 
eventual ability to decide for themselves which of those values and 
beliefs to accept or reject. 
2. The state’s minimum requirements of citizens generally 
Guaranteeing individuals’ basic liberty requires the continued 
existence of the guarantor, the state itself. Ensuring its own existence 
thus becomes a secondary end, and the state relies on its citizenry 
generally to perform functions necessary to achieve that end. First, 
citizens govern themselves. They sometimes do so directly but more 
frequently indirectly, when they choose those who will represent 
their interests in government. Their political participation ideally 
safeguards their own liberty, by checking state power and creating 
lawmaking bodies responsive to their general will (which presumably 
reflects their general welfare). Second, citizens drive the nation’s 
economy, their labor providing goods and services to meet society’s 
needs. And third, citizens procreate and care for the young, the 
state’s future. 
Its citizenry’s performance of these functions ensures the state’s 
continued existence and thus its ability to achieve its primary end, 
citizens’ liberty. But at the same time, the state does not compel 
 
 65. This is especially true in a society characterized by immigration and religious 
pluralism. Even absent the cultural and religious heterogeneity of the United States, however, 
theorists posit that pluralism is an enduring and ineradicable social fact. This is, they argue, due 
to the limits of human reason—we are not capable of developing universally acceptable 
justification of fundamental issues like truth, justice, or the meaning of life. Because of the 
importance of these issues, however, individuals strive to understand them, and having reached 
some understanding, live their lives accordingly. The freedom to do so in the liberal state 
enables individuals to determine their lives in this way. Pluralism itself thus becomes a 
permanent fact of life and an important secondary democratic value. 
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their performance by any particular citizen, because the state’s 
primary commitment to citizens’ liberty restrains it from doing so. 
Short of compulsion, though, state policies may create institutions 
and structures that seek to ensure citizens’ capacity to perform these 
necessary functions. Not all citizens will choose to perform all 
functions. The state can nonetheless achieve this secondary end when 
its citizenry collectively performs them.66 
B. The State’s Minimum Ends with Respect to Immature              
Citizens in Particular 
At the risk of again stating the obvious, immature citizens 
become mature ones. Thus to secure its ends, the state must attend 
to its immature citizens and the duality inherent in their citizenship: 
On the one hand, they at birth enjoy the legal status of citizens, who 
happen to be immature.67 But on the other, they lack the political 
and identity-related dimensions of citizenship and instead possess 
merely the potential to exercise the liberties and perform the 
functions of mature citizens. As such, they embody future mature 
citizens.68 The state should pursue its ends with respect to both 
young citizen-types. It otherwise risks failing twice over: first, with 
respect to citizens during their immaturity, then again later, after 
they have reached maturity. 
This Part first establishes that immature citizens have a claim to 
basic liberty, which the state must safeguard. The next Part, II.B.1, 
then examines what it means for the state to pursue its minimum 
ends—safeguarding citizens’ basic liberty—with respect to immature 
citizens. Part II.B.2 concludes by analyzing what it means for the 
state to pursue those ends with respect to the immature as future 
mature citizens. 
The immature are both distinct persons and citizens at birth, 
despite their temporary dependence and other incapacities.69 The 
 
 66. The term “citizenry” here thus refers to the collective body. While individual 
citizens might or might not choose civic participation, the collective citizenry must do so. 
 67. Theorists discuss three elements, or dimensions, of citizenship: legal, political, and 
identity (which refers to the psychological dimension of membership in a political community 
as a source of identity). See, e.g., Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, Citizenship in Culturally 
Diverse Societies: Issues, Contexts, Concepts, in CITIZENSHIP IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES 1–41 (W. 
Kymlicka & W. Norman eds., 2000). The immature are born with the legal status of 
citizenship but can later develop the political and identity dimensions of citizenship. 
 68. See id. 
 69. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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state’s ends would seem to include this subset of its citizenry, at least 
presumptively. Yet its ends seem inapplicable to the young; the very 
incapacities that characterize immature citizens render them 
generally unable either to exercise the basic liberty guaranteed by the 
state or to perform the functions required by it. Indeed, because the 
immature lack the capacity for rational choice, some theorists deny 
that they can have a right to liberty at all.70 
Theorists paint with too broad a brush, though, when they argue 
that liberty requires the capacity for rational choice. It is true that 
exercising certain specific liberties requires the capacity for rational 
choice.71 But the conception of negative liberty itself contemplates 
that liberty exists when others are restrained. Thus, when the state 
restrains others from exercising absolute authority over immature 
citizens, it ensures those immature citizens’ basic liberty. 
By denying all others absolute, unchecked power over them, the 
state ensures that even totally dependent immature citizens remain 
distinct persons, not wholly subsumed by the will of another. It is 
true that to affirmatively decide her life, the immature person must 
first develop the capacity to do so. It is only once a person has 
developed the capacity to exercise a specific liberty that she may be 
 
 70. John Stuart Mill, for example, suggested their non-right to be all but self-evident. 
After asserting the now-famous liberty principle, Mill thought it “perhaps hardly necessary to 
say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. 
We are not speaking of children . . . .” John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in THE UTILITARIANS 484 
(Doubleday 1961). See also, H.L.A. Hart, Bentham on Legal Rights, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN 
JURISPRUDENCE 192–97 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973); Hillel Steiner, Working Rights, in A 
DEBATE OVER RIGHTS 261 (Matthew H. Kramer ed., 1998); Lee E. Teitelbaum, Children’s 
Rights and the Problem of Equal Respect, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 799, 802–03 (1999). For a 
helpful overview and analysis of the philosophical debate, see JAMES G. DWYER, THE 
RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 291–307 (2006). Dwyer sets forth the primary 
arguments made both for and against the conceptual possibility of children’s having rights and 
concludes that children can indeed be rights-holders. 
 71. It is for this reason that some theorists find it more useful to discuss specific liberties 
to do specific things, rather than “liberty” generally. See, e.g., Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr., 
Negative and Positive Freedom, 76 PHIL. REV. 312 (1967). Thus, when the motorist’s specific 
liberty to drive on the sidewalk to his destination clashes with the pedestrian’s specific liberty to 
walk on the sidewalk to her destination, and the state interferes, one can more readily identify 
which specific liberty is restricted, which is preserved, and which greater, but still specific, 
liberty is advanced (the liberty of all to travel). Though the difference seems subtle, this 
construction more readily accommodates the sometimes necessary interferences with liberty—
when liberties clash, interference may guarantee the more important liberty (however defined) 
or maximize the total enjoyment of liberty (however measured). Adding the notion of specific 
liberties thus retains the negative ideal of liberty as the absence of restrictions and compulsions, 
without resort to a cartoonish conception of all interference with “individual liberty” as bad. 
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said to have an interest in doing so, if not a right. But persons may 
have basic liberty prior to developing those capacities.72 
The immature are thus citizens entitled to basic liberty. The next 
two Parts (II.B.1 and II.B.2) consider the implications of this 
conclusion. They address first the state’s pursuit of its ends with 
respect to the immature as current citizens and then with respect to 
the immature as future citizens. 
1. As citizens who happen to be immature 
Because the immature are both distinct persons and citizens, the 
state must endeavor to meet its minimum obligation to them during 
(and despite) their immaturity—it must guarantee their basic liberty. 
This does not require the state to bestow on them specific liberties 
that they do not yet have the capacity to exercise. Indeed, because of 
the very dependency that characterizes the immature, the state 
designates parents to be their default caregivers and grants them 
significant authority to carry out that role.73 But if the state were to 
defer absolutely to a child’s parents, then the parents’ will would 
control the child’s life and extinguish his distinct personhood. 
Parents would have total dominion over their children’s lives—
whether they lived or died, whether they endured brutal discipline or 
cruel neglect, whether they received an education, etc.74 Absolute 
deference thus empowers the parent to decide the child’s life, 
contrary to the minimum requirement of individual liberty. 
Ensuring the basic liberty of the immature thus requires the state 
to withhold from parents absolute or unchecked authority over 
them. To do otherwise affords parents the right to be other-
determining—an entitlement fundamentally inconsistent with the 
 
 72. See DAVID ARCHARD, CHILDREN: RIGHTS AND CHILDHOOD 98–104 (2004) 
(summarizing deontological arguments that, as humans, children have a right to liberty, given 
that human self-ownership is universal). 
 73. See infra Part III. 
 74. In colonial families, fathers in particular were granted virtually absolute authority 
over their dependent children. An advice book published in the early part of the seventeenth 
century cautioned parents to “provide carefully for two things: first that children’s wills and 
willfulness be restrained and repressed . . . . Children should not know, if it could be kept from 
them, that they have a will of their own, but in their parent’s keeping.” JOHN J. ROBINSON, 
OF CHILDREN AND THEIR EDUCATION (1628), quoted in Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History 
and Family Law, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 197, 201. Indeed, in several early colonies, the penalty 
for filial disobedience was death. Id. 
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minimum obligation of the state to all of its citizens. Parents’ 
childrearing authority must thus be something less than absolute. 
The immature do not have the capacity to exercise the residual 
authority over their lives that is withheld from parents, but the state 
does. And the state claims this authority through its role as parens 
patriae.75 
The state’s assertion of its parens patriae power can serve two 
functions: First, it can guarantee the basic negative liberty of the 
immature by withholding from others absolute authority over them. 
Second, it can pursue affirmatively the welfare of the immature by 
asserting the interests that it believes the immature person would 
advance herself, were she able to do so.76 The former role is arguably 
more consistent with a negative conception of liberty and the limited 
government it generally entails. The latter role is not necessarily 
inconsistent with those views, especially if the state’s assertion of 
authority is viewed as a proxy for the authority of the immature 
person. However, the latter role tends to be implemented by courts 
as an explicitly paternalistic interference and is somewhat less 
consistent with negative liberty.77 Regardless, exercising its parens 
 
 75. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A] 
parent’s interests in a child must be balanced against the State’s long-recognized interests as 
parens patriae.” (internal citations omitted)); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 
(1944). The concept, which means literally “parent of the country,” derives from the English 
common law concept of pater patriae, or “father of the country.” 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *47. Pater patriae referred to the British Crown’s inherent power as 
sovereign. In Britain, the Crown delegated its authority over domestic relations to the 
chancery courts. Among their delegated duties, chancery courts assumed the obligation to 
guard the interests of those unable to protect themselves. The crown then surrendered its 
sovereign power to the democratic state once it attained independence. See Wheeler v. Smith, 
50 U.S. 55, 78 (1850). 
 76. See DWYER, supra note 70, at 195–203. 
 77. See, e.g., Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United 
States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890) (noting that as parens patriae, the state performs a “most 
beneficent” function, and its intervention must “often necessar[ily] . . . be exercised in the 
interests of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect 
themselves”). The U.S. courts expanded the concept of parens patriae well into the nineteenth 
century, invoking the doctrine to uphold sweeping child protection statutes that authorized 
significant state intervention into families. See Developments in the Law: The Constitution and 
the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1198, 1225–61 (1980). See generally Jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae: 
An Overview, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1847 (2000) (discussing extension of parens patriae role to 
allow states to assert various sorts of claims on behalf of their citizens). In the early twentieth 
century, however, the Supreme Court reined in its use, noting that the state’s exercise of its 
parens patriae power implicated and was limited by parents’ constitutionally protected rights in 
childrearing, discussed further in the next Part. See generally Gregory Thomas, Limitations on 
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patriae authority is a necessary liberty-protecting function of 
government in the liberal constitutional democracy. 
2. As future mature citizens 
Guaranteeing citizens’ basic liberty during their immaturity is 
necessary but not sufficient to ensure their future liberty. The state 
must also attend to the effects this period will have on their lives as 
future mature citizens, for it is during their immaturity that they 
must develop the capacities to exercise the liberties and perform the 
functions of mature citizens. This section thus identifies additional, 
intermediate ends the state should pursue during citizens’ 
immaturity to help secure its minimum basic ends once they reach 
maturity. 
Again, the liberty to decide ultimately how one’s life will go—
choosing one’s social, moral, and political commitments—is a 
minimum entitlement of the citizen in the liberal state.78 
Guaranteeing that basic liberty is the state’s primary end. Its 
secondary end is ensuring the citizenry’s capacity to perform those 
functions essential to the state’s existence. Immature citizens lack but 
should develop (absent infirmity or disability) the capacities to 
exercise the liberties and perform the functions of citizenship. 
The minimum obligation of the state with respect to the future 
mature citizen is thus to deny all others the right to deprive 
immature citizens of the ability to develop their capacities. It must 
prevent during citizens’ immaturity the sorts of interference that 
keep young citizens from developing the capacities essential for 
citizenship. 
Once citizens have attained these basic capacities, the state has 
arguably achieved its minimum ends with respect to them. It cannot 
force citizens to employ their capacities in any particular way. The 
manner in which they choose to employ their capacities is ultimately 
up to citizens themselves. 
What must the state prevent—or require—during citizens’ 
immaturity in order to preserve their ability to make life-deciding 
choices? At a minimum, having the capacity to decide one’s life 
course means that one must be reasonably aware of one’s options 
 
Parens Patriae: The State and the Parent/Child Relationship, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 51 
(2005). 
 78. See supra Part II.A.1. 
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and have some reasonable ability to avail oneself of those options. 
One cannot “choose” without knowledge of, and ability to pursue, 
one’s alternatives. 
Since all citizens are born into a certain social context, that 
context—the community’s culture, their parents’ values and beliefs, 
their material circumstances, etc.—will likely influence their eventual 
preferences and choices. As discussed above, the liberal state expects 
that immature citizens will experience these sorts of influences.79 
When it ensures all citizens’ liberty (its minimum end), the state 
allows them to pursue different conceptions of the good life. The 
state—which is in the business of liberty-protecting, not good-life-
selecting—views the coexistence of competing conceptions of the 
good life as a good in itself. Pluralism not only allows citizens to live 
according to a given conception of the good life, it also enables 
citizens to choose among different conceptions or choose the best 
aspects of different conceptions to achieve what may be an improved 
conception.80 In this way, respect for pluralism ensures individual 
liberty and also paves the way for social progress. 
As they go about pursuing their own conceptions of the good 
life, citizens will form families and raise children. Expressing their 
identities and living according to their values usually includes 
instilling those values in their children and thus influencing their 
conceptions of the good life.81 But influence unchecked becomes 
imperative. The state must protect the immature from external 
influence run amok, and that includes parental influence.82 The state 
may thus legitimately restrain or constrain parents’ liberties in order 
to guarantee the later basic liberties of the future mature citizen. 
Having identified them, state actors must next determine how to 
go about achieving the state’s ends with respect to the immature. 
The state operates within a space defined by both constitutional 
limits and political realities. Parents and the immature themselves 
have interests and protected rights that may coincide with or diverge 
from the state’s goals. State decision making must also account in 
some principled way for these interests and rights. 
 
 79. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 80. See supra note 65 (discussing the argument that pluralism is an ineradicable fact in 
the liberal state). 
 81. See infra Part III. 
 82. See supra Part II.A.1 (arguing that to achieve its basic end, the state must deny all 
persons the right to be other-determining). 
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This Part has identified the state’s minimum ends with respect to 
both its mature and immature citizens. Parts III and IV respectively 
examine parents’ and then immature persons’ interests and 
constitutional rights. To better understand the trajectory of 
immature citizens’ development to maturity and its potential 
implications for policymaking, Part IV also surveys research on 
development. Part V synthesizes the considerations of the previous 
three Parts into a framework comprising a set of ends to guide state 
decision making, and it proposes policies consistent with it. 
III. PARENT CITIZENS 
To be constitutional, state decisions affecting the immature must 
respect the rights of their parents. But they must go beyond that: to 
be successful, they must also heed the interests of parents. 
The concept of family in the United States has always involved 
notions of parental entitlement, authority, and responsibility.83 
Under early common law, fathers had a “natural” right to control 
their children, and paternal authority was absolute.84 Fathers also, 
though, had a duty to protect and educate their children. By 
performing that duty, they perfected their natural entitlement; in 
exchange for protecting and educating them, fathers earned rights 
over their children and their children’s labor.85 
Parental authority itself has weakened (and is now gender-
neutral), but the rhetoric of strong parental rights endures.86 Both 
 
 83. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (acknowledging parents’ 
rights over and duties towards their children, observing that “[t]he child is not the mere 
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled 
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”); Vivian 
Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 38–45 (2006) (discussing 
historical concepts of paternal authority). 
 84. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *452–53. See also Barbara Bennett 
Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child?: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 995, 1089–91 (1992) (discussing the historical view that children “belong[ed] 
to parents”). 
 85. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 84 (describing children as the property of their fathers, 
who had a presumptive entitlement to their custody, labor, and earnings in exchange for 
providing for their care and education). See also Katherine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing 
Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293 (1988) (arguing as well that the notion of exchange was central 
to historical conceptions of parents’ rights and obligations, stating that “[s]ince the earliest 
days of the modern liberal state, parenthood has been expressed in terms of exchange: Parents 
have rights with respect to their children in exchange for the performance of their parental 
responsibilities.”). 
 86. See infra Part III.B. 
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the natural rights and exchange views of parental rights persist.87 The 
natural rights justification in particular, however, appears 
infrequently.88 This decline likely reflects increasing respect and 
concern for children as persons. Some scholars would extend that 
respect and concern further. James Dwyer, for example, contends 
that granting any individual a “right” to control the life of another 
contravenes the legal and moral commitments of the liberal state.89 
Illiberal qualities notwithstanding, today two basic arguments in 
support of strong parental rights predominate. The first is 
deontological: autonomy is the primary good, and parental rights 
further parental autonomy. Those who espouse it tend to assume 
that shaping one’s children’s lives is central to one’s self-
determination, and that it is legitimately so.90 The second argument 
for strong parental rights is instrumental, or utilitarian: it maintains 
that deference to parental rights advances children’s welfare.91 
This Part examines both parents’ interests in and rights to 
childrearing. First, Part III.A addresses parents’ interests. While the 
state has adopted an increasingly child-centered and thus 
instrumental view of parents’ rights, many parents view strong child-
rearing rights as facilitating what is also for them an enduring act of 
 
 87. See, e.g., Woodhouse, supra note 84 (arguing the persistence of the notion of 
parental ownership of children); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 
81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2404 (1995) (arguing that “[t]he contract metaphor makes explicit what 
is implicit in contemporary family law: parental ‘rights’ are granted as ex ante compensation for 
the satisfactory performance of voluntarily assumed responsibilities to provide for the child’s 
interests.”). 
 88. But see Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 937, 961–62 (1996) (making the “self-evident” argument that “the child belongs 
to its parents. The child owes its conception to sexual intercourse between its mother and 
father, and its birth to the reproductive labor of its mother . . . . As against the rest of the 
world, the child is its parents’ ‘own’”). 
 89. See, e.g., James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking the 
Doctrine of Parents’ Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371 (1994) [hereinafter Dwyer, Parents’ Religion 
and Children’s Welfare]. Dwyer suggests that parenting should be a privilege, not a right at all. 
Part V.C.2, infra, considers these arguments. 
 90. Gilles, supra note 88, at 962–63. 
 91. See, e.g., JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
6–8 (1973) (“To safeguard the right of parents to raise their children as they see fit, free of 
government intrusion, . . . is to safeguard each child’s need for continuity.”); Emily Buss, 
‘Parental’ Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 636 (2002) (arguing for strong constitutional 
protection for parents’ child rearing authority, driven by an “assessment of its value to 
children”); Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the 
Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 864 (2000) (arguing that parents’ 
rights derive from children’s interests). 
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self-expression. Part III.B next analyzes the constitutional 
jurisprudence of parental rights. This analysis reveals that the scope 
of parents’ actual authority is weaker than the Supreme Court’s 
rhetoric of strong parental rights suggests.92 This Part concludes by 
assessing the implications of parents’ interests and rights for state 
decision making with respect to the immature. It argues that parents’ 
rights as currently conceived impose few constraints on the state’s 
ability to act to secure its ends. Parents’ interests, on the other hand, 
pose a potential challenge but also a potential opportunity. Parents 
overwhelmingly care deeply about parenting and can wield 
significant influence over their children, and the state should 
endeavor to accommodate their interests where possible. Such 
accommodation engages them as partners in a collaborative child- 
and future-citizen-rearing endeavor. 
A. Parents’ Interests 
Individuals generally consider forming and raising a family to be 
essential aspects of their lives and self-identities.93 Stephen Gilles 
asserts that “[t]he project of parenting—having, nurturing, and 
educating one’s children—is central to our conception of human 
flourishing.”94 And even in the compulsive context of legal academic 
writing, Gilles—surely because it is so intuitive as to be virtually self-
evident—cites no authority to support this proposition. Along the 
same lines, some political theorists consider parenting to be one of 
the core freedoms in the liberal state, because parenting represents 
 
 92. The Supreme Court most recently reiterated the rhetoric of “fundamental” parental 
rights while simultaneously circumscribing parents’ rights in Troxel v. Granville. 530 U.S. 57 
(2000). See David D. Meyer, Constitutional Pragmatism for a Changing American Family, 32 
RUTGERS L.J. 711 (2001) (arguing that Troxel limited rather than expanded parental rights by 
failing to subject the challenged statute to strict scrutiny). 
 93. See CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 150–52 (1978) (“[T]he right to form 
one’s child’s values [and] one’s child’s life plan . . . are extensions of the basic right not to be 
interfered with in doing these things for one[’s] self.”). The Supreme Court has acknowledged 
as much. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982) (“[It is] plain beyond the 
need for multiple citation that a natural parent’s desire for and right to the companionship, 
care, custody, and management of his or her children is an interest far more precious than any 
property right.” (citations omitted)). See generally ARCHARD, supra note 72 (summarizing 
arguments advanced to justify natural parents’ entitlement to raise their children, including 
parents’ interests). 
 94. Gilles, supra note 88, at 962. 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2010 2:07:23 PM 
1055 Immature Citizens and the State 
 1085 
one of the “central meaning-giving tasks” of life.95 Eamonn Callan, 
for example, asserts that: 
[T]he freedom to rear our children according to the dictates of 
conscience is for most of us as important as any other expression of 
conscience, and the freedom to organize and sustain the life of the 
family in keeping with our own values is as significant as our liberty 
to associate outside the family for any purpose whatever.96 
For parents themselves, then, parenting is much more than an 
instrumental endeavor; it is also an exercise in self-expression. 
Another political theorist, William Galston, has elaborated pointedly 
on the expressive aspects of parenting.97 He argues that parents’ 
expressive interests in raising children in accordance with their values 
are “not reducible to their fiduciary duty to promote their children’s 
interests.”98 Without eliding the importance of that fiduciary duty, 
Galston reasons that parents’ self-expressive interests merit 
consideration too, because through the “intimate particularity of the 
parent-child bond, . . . [one’s] child is in part (though only in part) 
an extension of ourselves.”99 
It thus seems safe to conclude that parents’ primary interest with 
respect to the immature is to raise their children as they themselves—
as opposed to the state—deem best. For most parents, this means 
instilling their own values and beliefs in their children.100 
B. Parenting as a Constitutionally Protected Right 
The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the existence 
of a substantive right to parent that shields parents’ childrearing 
decisions from unwarranted state interference. The magnitude and 
contours of that right, however—like those of other rights relating to 
 
 95. EAMONN CALLAN, CREATING CITIZENS: POLITICAL EDUCATION AND LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY 146–47 (1997). 
 96. Id. 
 97. William A. Galston, Parents, Government, and Children: Authority Over Education 
in the Liberal Democratic State, in CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE, NOMOS XLIV 211, 223–32 
(Stephen Macedo & Iris Marion Young eds., 2003) [hereinafter Galston, Parents, Government, 
and Children]. See WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF 
VALUE PLURALISM FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE passim (2002). 
 98. Galston, Parents, Government, and Children, supra note 97, at 226–27. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Gilles, supra note 88, at 965 (“[L]oving and nurturing a child cannot sensibly or 
practically be divorced from shaping that child’s values.”). 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2010 2:07:23 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
1086 
family life—are notoriously indistinct.101 What is clear is that the 
right to parent is weaker than the Court’s rhetoric suggests.102 
Although the Court regularly describes the right as fundamental, it 
has employed something like true strict scrutiny only in cases where 
state action has gone so far as to threaten the existence of the parent-
child relationship itself.103 The singular exception has been Wisconsin 
v. Yoder, where the Court required the state of Wisconsin to exempt 
Amish students from compulsory school attendance laws.104 In 
Yoder, however, parents’ childrearing rights combined with their 
First Amendment free exercise claim to elevate the level of scrutiny 
to which the Court subjected the state’s action.105 
The following Parts briefly address the origins of the Court’s 
parental rights jurisprudence, and then survey cases where the Court 
evaluated state actions that interfered with parents’ childrearing 
rights. This survey demonstrates that the Court subjects to strict 
scrutiny state action that threatens to sever the parent-child 
relationship altogether (Part III.B.2), but that it subjects to lesser 
scrutiny state action that poses a lesser threat to that relationship 
(Part III.B.3). Part III.C concludes by identifying the coherence 
within the Court’s jurisprudence of parents’ rights, then assessing the 
implications of those rights and of parents’ interests for state decision 
making affecting the immature. 
 
 101. See David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527, 529 
(2000) (“The Court’s family privacy cases have left pointedly unclear both what sorts of private 
conduct are deserving of heightened protection and what form that protection should take.”). 
 102. See id. at 546 (arguing that in most parental rights cases, “the Court seems to apply 
a more free-form ‘reasonableness’ test to government actions that impede a parent’s child-
rearing authority”); Francis Barry McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning 
of Parental Rights, 22 GA. L. REV. 975, 988–89 (1988) (suggesting that early parental rights 
cases Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder provide little deference to parents’ rights per se; instead, parents’ 
rights receive fundamental protection only when combined with other constitutional rights, 
like parents’ free exercise claims). 
 103. See infra Part III.B.2–3. 
 104. 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (applying strict scrutiny but implying that constitutional 
interests other than the parents’ childrearing rights, namely their free exercise rights, justified 
the application of that standard of review). 
 105. Id. See also McCarthy, supra note 102 (suggesting that it was only because parents’ 
rights in Yoder were tied to their free exercise claims that they were elevated to true 
fundamental right status). 
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1. Origins 
The right to parent originates from a source most familiar in 
constitutional law. It begins with the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment: “No state shall . . . deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”106 A strict 
reading of this text suggests that the Amendment offers procedural 
protection but permits any deprivation of life, liberty, or property, so 
long as the deprivation is accompanied by “due process of law.” The 
Supreme Court, however, has rejected that strict reading. It has 
instead interpreted the Due Process Clause to protect certain 
substantive liberties from state interference.107 
During what is known as the Lochner Era, extending from the 
late 1890s to the late 1930s, the Supreme Court adopted a broad 
view of constitutionally protected liberty interests and subjected even 
economic legislation to “exacting review.”108 The Court’s holdings 
in those cases repeatedly overturned legislation and constrained 
legislative power.109 
In two Lochner-Era cases, Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters, the Court for the first time interpreted “liberty” in the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to provide substantive 
protection for family autonomy.110 The cases did not centrally 
concern parents’ liberty interests in childrearing, however; parents 
did not join as parties in either case, and the Court focused as much 
on the contractual liberty of educators as on the childrearing liberty 
of parents.111 In Meyer, the Court invalidated state legislation 
 
 106. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 107. Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63, 70 
(2006). 
 108. See, e.g., Moorehead v. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 
261 U.S. 525 (1923); Coppage v. Kan., 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 
161 (1908); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 4 
(1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). But see Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. 
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). See HOWARD 
GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE 
POWERS JURISPRUDENCE passim (1993). 
 109. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 500–
03 (15th ed. 2004). 
 110. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 
(1923). See also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
798 (3d ed. 2006). 
 111. See David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy After Troxel and Carhart, 
48 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1130–31 (2001); William G. Ross, The Contemporary Significance of 
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restricting the teaching of foreign languages in public and private 
elementary schools.112 In Pierce, the Court invalidated state 
legislation requiring that all children be educated in public 
schools.113 
Although the Court later repudiated the economic due process 
cases of the Lochner era, Meyer and Pierce remain good law, and the 
Court invokes them as the foundations of its modern substantive due 
process jurisprudence, which includes protection for parental 
rights.114 The Court reads the two cases as having established “that 
the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right 
of parents to ‘establish a home and bring up children’ and . . . ‘to 
direct the upbringing and education of children under their 
control.’”115 
The Court in both Meyer and Pierce, while holding that states 
had overstepped their bounds, also discussed the significance of the 
state’s countervailing interest in its child citizens. The Meyer Court 
observed “[t]hat the state may do much, go very far, indeed, in 
order to improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and 
morally.”116 In Pierce, the Court similarly noted the expansive right 
of states to regulate children’s educations, emphasizing that “[n]o 
question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to 
regulate all schools, . . . to require that all children of proper age 
attend some school, . . . [and to require] that certain studies plainly 
essential to good citizenship must be taught . . . ”117 It thus made 
clear that its holdings left intact states’ power to mandate school 
 
Meyer and Pierce for Parental Rights Issues Involving Education, 34 AKRON L. REV. 177, 178 
(2000). 
 112. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390. The same day it decided Meyer, the Supreme Court decided 
Bartels v. Iowa, in which it invalidated Iowa, Ohio, and Nebraska statutes requiring that all 
school instruction be conducted in English (the Nebraska statute had replaced the statute at 
issue in Meyer). 262 U.S. 404 (1923). 
 113. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 510. 
 114. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000) (citing Meyer and Pierce as 
having established the right of parents to establish a home and direct the upbringing and 
education of their children). See also Susan E. Lawrence, Substantive Due Process and Parental 
Rights: From Meyer v. Nebraska to Troxel v. Granville, 8 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 71, 72–73 (2006). 
 115. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (quoting both Meyer and Pierce). See also Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (reading Meyer and Pierce as having established a 
“private realm of family life which the state cannot enter,” but upholding state legislation 
restricting guardian’s right to permit her child to engage in street proselytizing). 
 116. 262 U.S. at 401. 
 117. 268 U.S. at 534. 
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attendance and to dictate (at least to some extent) the content of 
children’s education. 
The Court next addressed a parental rights claim in Prince v. 
Massachusetts.118 Though it is regularly cited to demonstrate the 
Court’s respect for parental rights,119 Prince upheld the enforcement 
of state child labor laws against a child’s guardian who asserted both 
First Amendment freedom of religion and Fourteenth Amendment 
parental rights and equal protection claims.120 The Court in Prince 
acknowledged that “the custody, care and nurture of the child reside 
first in the parents” but held that the state’s power to protect 
children’s welfare could, and in that case did, trump parental 
authority.121 
2. Modern treatment: threats to the existence of the parent-child 
relationship 
The Supreme Court has applied its most searching level of 
scrutiny only when state action has threatened to end the parent-
child relationship altogether.122 The Court has emphasized both the 
potential significance and finality of such action,123 distinguishing it 
from lesser interferences with the parent-child relationship, including 
removal of a child from a parent’s custody.124 
The cases in which the Court applied strict scrutiny have 
concerned procedural violations of parental rights. In Stanley v. 
Illinois, for instance, a state law placed the children of an unmarried 
mother in the state’s care after her death, removing them from their 
father’s care.125 The Court held the law unconstitutional, requiring 
 
 118. 321 U.S. 158 (1943). 
 119. See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (citing Prince as “confirm[ing] that there is a 
constitutional dimension to the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children”). 
 120. 321 U.S. 158. 
 121. Id. at 165–66. The Court stated that “[a]cting to guard the general interest in 
youth’s well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control by requiring 
school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor, and in many other ways.” Id. at 
166. 
 122. See, e.g., David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of the 
Faultless Father, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 838–45 (1999) [hereinafter Meyer, Family Ties]. 
 123. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham City, 452 U.S. 18, 39 (1981) (describing 
“termination of parental rights [as] both total and irrevocable”). 
 124. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (“In contrast to loss of custody, which does 
not sever the parent-child bond, parental status termination is ‘irretrievabl[y] destructi[ve]’ of 
the most fundamental family relationship.” (alterations in original; internal citations omitted)). 
 125. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
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the state to show parental unfitness before terminating parental 
rights.126 In Santosky v. Kramer, the Court held that the government 
must meet an elevated burden of proof—that of clear and convincing 
evidence—before terminating parental rights.127 
3. Modern treatment: lesser threats to parental authority 
The Court distinguishes less drastic intrusions into parents’ 
rights, generally subjecting to something less than strict scrutiny 
state interference that stops short of extinguishing those rights. In 
doing so, it treats the right to parent in a way similar to the way it 
treats the fundamental right to marry. With respect to the latter, the 
Court has stated that: 
By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry, we 
do not mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates in 
any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be 
subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable 
regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter 
into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed.128 
Yoder is probably the most prominent of the twentieth century 
parental rights cases, though the importance of free exercise of 
religion to its outcome clouds its place in the parental rights 
firmament. Amish parents challenged a state statute requiring that all 
children attend school until the age of sixteen.129 The Supreme 
Court held in favor of the parents primarily because the statute 
infringed on their free exercise rights, not because it infringed their 
right to control the education of their children.130 Chief Justice 
Burger emphasized this in his opinion for the Court: 
A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be 
interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if 
 
 126. Stanley, 405 U.S. 645. 
 127. 455 U.S. 745 (1982). But cf. Lassiter, 452 U.S. 18 (finding that the state was not 
required to provide a government-appointed lawyer for indigent appellants in all parental rights 
termination proceedings). 
 128. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386–87 (1978) (citing Califano v. Jobst, 434 
U.S. 47, n.12 (1977)) (emphasis added). 
 129. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 130. Id. at 215–16. See also McCarthy, supra note 102, at 988–89. McCarthy argues that 
dicta in the Yoder opinion “indicate the view of Chief Justice Burger and others that the 
parental right to control the education of his child should have minimal deference when it is 
not tied to some other constitutional right.” 
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it is based on purely secular considerations . . . [T]he very concept 
of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own 
standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has 
important interests. Thus, if the Amish asserted their claims because 
of their subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary 
secular values accepted by the majority, . . . their claims would 
not . . . arise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.131 
The Court also elected weaker scrutiny of state interference with 
parents’ educational decisions in Runyon v. McCrary, dismantling 
private, racially segregated schools and holding that parents’ right to 
provide their children with a private school education was subject to 
“reasonable governmental regulation.”132 The Court had earlier—
and strikingly—undercut parents’ influence in the schoolhouse by 
affirming without opinion a lower court decision upholding a state 
statute that permitted schools to corporeally punish children over the 
objection of their parents.133 
In the only modern case presenting it with the opportunity to 
clarify the constitutional right of parents to control the upbringing of 
their children, Troxel v. Granville, the Supreme Court instead 
muddied the waters by declining to apply strict scrutiny.134 In Troxel, 
a parent challenged a state third-party visitation statute that 
permitted “any person” to petition a court for visitation rights with a 
child “at any time.”135 Even if a parent objected, the court could 
order visitation under the statute if it found that “visitation would 
serve the best interests of the child.”136 The Court invalidated the 
statute, but the case fractured the Court, leading to six separate 
opinions.137 A concurring opinion by Justice Thomas (the most 
protective of parents’ rights) and a dissent by Justice Scalia (the least 
protective) bookended the other approaches taken by the Justices. 
Justice Thomas criticized the Justices of the plurality for recognizing 
 
 131. 406 U.S. at 215–16. 
 132. 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976). 
 133. Baker v. Owen, 423 U.S. 907 (1975), aff’g 395 F. Supp. 294 (1975). 
 134. 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000) (holding that Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process 
Clause provides “heightened protection” against state’s interference with parents’ right to 
make decisions as to care, custody, and control of their children). See also Emily Buss, Adrift in 
the Middle: Parental Rights After Troxel v. Granville, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 279 [hereinafter 
Buss, Adrift in the Middle]. 
 135. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.10.160(3) (1996). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 57. 
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the fundamental right to parent but failing to apply the appropriate 
standard of review. He wrote that he “would apply strict scrutiny to 
infringements of fundamental rights.”138 Scalia, at the other extreme, 
argued that there was no fundamental right to parent and would 
have upheld the statute under a deferential standard of review.139 
The remaining seven Justices, in four opinions, employed 
language endorsing a fundamental right to parent, yet the Court 
found the statute unconstitutional without reaching the scope of the 
parental due process right, and without subjecting the statute to 
strict scrutiny or a similarly heightened standard of review.140 Justice 
O’Connor, writing for a plurality, instead found the statute 
unconstitutional as applied, not because the state court had 
intervened in the family, but because when it did so, it “failed to 
accord the determination of Granville, a fit custodial parent, any 
material weight.”141 
Justices Stevens and Kennedy dissented, indicating that a best-
interest-based standard for third-party visitation cases could 
sufficiently protect parents’ interests.142 Justice Kennedy emphasized 
the changing nature of the modern family, rejecting “the assumption 
that the parent or parents who resist visitation have always been the 
child’s primary caregivers and that the third parties who seek 
visitation have no legitimate and established relationship with the 
child.”143 Justice Stevens emphasized the importance of balancing a 
parent’s interest against not only the state’s interest as parens patriae, 
 
 138. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 139. Id. at 91–93 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 140. Id. Custody and visitation cases involving children’s natural parents do not usually 
raise constitutional issues. When they do—such as when aspects of a custodial determination 
implicate a parent’s First Amendment free exercise right, courts frequently adopt a “harm” 
standard. This standard is more protective of parents’ rights than the typical “best interests of 
the child” standard. It requires that a court decline to intervene unless its inaction will lead to 
definite and concrete harm to the child. See Lauren D. Freeman, The Child's Best Interests vs. 
the Parent's Free Exercise of Religion, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 73, 81–84 (1998). When 
the harm standard applies in the third-party visitation context, a court would decline to award 
such visitation unless it found that failing to do so would result in harm to the child. See, e.g., 
Williams v. Williams, 501 S.E.2d 417, 418 (1998) (interpreting Virginia third-party visitation 
statute to authorize entry of visitation order only upon finding that child would be harmed 
absent such order). 
 141. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72 (plurality opinion). 
 142. See id. at 85–91 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 97–100 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 143. Id. at 98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy observed that the “conventional 
nuclear family . . . is simply not the structure or prevailing condition in many households.” Id. 
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but also against the child’s own interest in preserving relationships.144 
He further noted that “to the extent parents and families have 
fundamental liberty interests in preserving such intimate 
relationships, so, too, do children have these interests, and so, too, 
must their interests be balanced in the equation.”145 
Together, then, eight Justices of the Court declined to provide 
parents significant protection from state intervention.146 
Making doctrinal sense of the Court’s parental rights 
jurisprudence thus requires some work. When addressing parents’ 
right to the care, custody, and control of their children, a majority of 
the Court seems to use the “fundamental right” to parent as a 
reassuring trope. Yet its retention of fundamental rights rhetoric 
signals little more than the presumptive right of parents to direct the 
upbringing of their children. State action that interferes with parents’ 
authority yet stops short of threatening the existence of the parent-
child relationship has yet to trigger explicit, true strict scrutiny review 
by the Supreme Court.147 
Despite the Court’s obfuscation, there is a simple coherence to 
the variable nature of the parental right. When its very existence is 
endangered, it is at its strongest. But when the state interferes with it 
to any lesser degree, it is treated with far less deference. 
C. Implications: Parents’ Interests, Parents’ Rights 
The implications of the Supreme Court’s parental rights 
jurisprudence for state actors formulating policies affecting the 
immature are clear: “[T]he state may do much, go very far, 
indeed”148 to advance its ends before being considered to have 
infringed parents’ rights. 
The implications of parents’ interests for state decision-making 
are less clear. Parents do care deeply about childrearing—so much so 
that for many raising their children is an activity that is self-defining. 
State actors may safely draw from this generalization two 
conclusions. The first is a cautionary one: Policies affecting children 
that fail to respect or account for their parents’ interests in 
 
 144. Id. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 57. See also Buss, Adrift in the Middle, supra note 134, at 284. 
 147. See Meyer, Family Ties, supra note 122, at 841. 
 148. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923). 
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childrearing have little chance of success. Parents have the 
opportunity, as their children’s primary caregivers and those with the 
most access to their children, to thwart state policy goals. The state 
should avoid giving them a motive to do so. The second conclusion, 
though, is more optimistic: State policies can, and should, take 
advantage of parents’ preexisting tendencies to invest in their 
children’s well-being. Parents’ nurturing can further and 
complement the state’s ends. Identifying the most effective way in 
which parents and the state might divide, or share, responsibility for 
children that respects parents’ interests and achieves the state’s ends 
is the state decision maker’s challenge. 
IV. IMMATURE CITIZENS 
Part II identified the state’s ends with respect to its citizens 
generally, and the immature in particular. Part III first examined 
parents’ interests, which the state should consider and account for 
when making decisions affecting the immature, and then parents’ 
rights, which the state must consider and account for when doing so. 
This Part explores the interests and rights of the immature 
themselves, and the changes to both wrought by the course of their 
development to maturity. 
Part IV.A examines the interests of the immature. Part IV.B 
surveys the contours of their constitutional rights. Part IV.C reviews 
research in cognitive development to gain a better understanding of 
the course of their developmental processes. This review discusses 
behavioral and biological aspects of development, how external 
factors can influence its course, and insights this research affords into 
the capacities and deficiencies of the young as they develop to 
maturity. It begins (in IV.C.1) with significant aspects of 
development in infancy and early childhood, then discusses (in 
IV.C.2) those of adolescence and young adulthood. Part IV.C.3 
concludes by discussing those implications of this research that 
ought to be of special concern to state decision makers, laying the 
groundwork for the Article’s later contention that state actors in 
judicial and legislative contexts should become better informed 
about, and take better account of, development. 
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A. Interests 
All citizens, including the immature, have a minimum 
entitlement to liberty, and it is the state’s duty to guarantee it.149 
This Part goes beyond this basic entitlement, identifying interests 
that the immature may have that do not necessarily impose 
corresponding duties on the state or on other persons. As it is with 
parents’ interests, it is nonetheless important to identify the interests 
of the young, so that the state may consider them in its decision 
making. The next Part surveys those specific interests that have 
received special constitutional status and protection. 
The interests of the young change dramatically as they develop 
to maturity. But they can be said to have two basic categories of 
interests: welfare interests and autonomy interests.150 Welfare 
interests pertain to their well-being, irrespective of any affirmative or 
rational choice they make. Autonomy interests refer to their interests 
in making self-determining choices and having the freedom to 
exercise the liberties of which they are capable.151 
The immature have three basic welfare interests: First, they have 
an interest in receiving care appropriate to the level of their 
dependency; second, they have an interest in acquiring those 
prerequisites necessary to attain their mature capacities—i.e., the 
abilities required for them to exercise their basic, life-deciding 
liberty; and third, they have an interest in being protected from their 
own deficiencies.152 
Their autonomy-related interest is even more straightforward, at 
least conceptually: The immature have an interest in exercising those 
specific liberties of which they are capable. Determining which 
liberties they are capable of exercising, however, can present any 
number of difficulties—even where researchers have identified 
 
 149. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 150. This nomenclature borrows from the language of rights. Theorists generally take the 
view that rights derive from and protect either rational choice or autonomy only (the “Will 
Theory of Rights”), or persons’ important interests or welfare more generally, independent of 
choices they make (the “Interest Theory of Rights”). See DWYER, supra note 70, at 291–94. 
See also LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND THE LAW: 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN THE HOME, SCHOOLS, AND JUVENILE COURTS 315 
(2002) (characterizing children’s rights as comprising welfare claims and autonomy claims). 
 151. DWYER, supra note 70, at 291–94. 
 152. One might view this as part or derivative of their interest in dependency-appropriate 
care. I note the third interest separately, however, to emphasize the possibility of immature 
citizens’ welfare interests conflicting with their subjective autonomy interests. 
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normative capacities, for example, there will be individuals whose 
capacities vary from the norm. Part IV.C begins to address these 
questions. 
As it weighs policies, the state should consider and account for 
the interests of the immature; but it must respect their rights. A brief 
discussion of those of their rights addressed by the Supreme Court 
thus follows. 
B. Constitutional Rights 
The state considers the immature to be rights-holders. 
“Constitutional rights,” according to the Supreme Court, “do not 
mature and come into being magically only when one attains the 
state-defined age of majority.”153 Though it has addressed children’s 
rights under the Constitution in relatively few cases, when it has 
done so the Court has consistently declared children to be “persons” 
generally “protected by the same constitutional guarantees against 
governmental deprivations as are adults.”154 The Court has also 
consistently asserted, however, that children’s rights are not 
coextensive with those of adults, due to “the peculiar vulnerability of 
children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, 
mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in 
childrearing.”155 Whereas, for example, children have protected 
speech and free exercise rights in public schools,156 those rights are 
not identical to those afforded adults in other contexts. Instead, the 
 
 153. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). 
 154. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (holding that minors’ right to abortion 
requires statutes imposing parental consent requirements also contain judicial bypass provision 
allowing minor to seek judicial approval for procedure without first notifying her parents). See 
also Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74 (stating that “[m]inors, as well as adults, are protected by the 
Constitution and possess constitutional rights.”); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975) 
(interpreting the Due Process Clause to require notice of charges and opportunity to be heard 
prior to suspension from public school). 
 155. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634. See also, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 682 (noting that 
the First Amendment rights of students in the public schools “are not automatically 
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings” (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
325, 340–42 (1985))). 
 156. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (holding that 
the First Amendment protected students’ right to wear to school black arm bands in protest of 
the Vietnam War without being subject to discipline); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631 (1943) (holding that the First Amendment prohibited state from 
compelling students to salute the flag in contravention of students’ religious beliefs). 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2010 2:07:23 PM 
1055 Immature Citizens and the State 
 1097 
Court gives significant weight to the state’s countervailing interests 
in maintaining control of the educational environment.157 
Because of children’s less-than-competent decision-making 
abilities, their parents have presumptive authority to make decisions 
on their behalf, such as deciding their medical care.158 The Court has 
implicitly recognized that even during their immaturity, however, 
minors can acquire decision-making competence that entitles them 
to some decisional autonomy. The Court has thus extended them a 
right to privacy with respect to their intimate lives, enabling them to 
access contraception and obtain abortions without having to notify 
or obtain the consent of their parents.159 States wanting to require 
minors to obtain parental consent to an abortion may impose such a 
requirement only if they also provide an alternative procedure for the 
minor to obtain authorization.160 The Court thus acknowledges 
parents’ authority and interests in childrearing, but it withholds from 
them an entitlement to veto the minor’s decision.161 
In the juvenile courts, accused youthful offenders receive many 
of the procedural protections guaranteed adults in the criminal 
justice system.162 But whereas the Supreme Court implicitly 
 
 157. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (holding that school’s interest in 
preventing the promotion of illegal drugs outweighed students’ speech rights); Bethel School 
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (finding no First Amendment violation when 
public school prohibited students’ use of “vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse”); 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (finding due process did not require prior notice or 
hearing before public school officials sanctioned student by beating with a paddle). 
 158. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (holding that due process requires only 
informal review by a neutral physician prior to a child’s being committed to a psychiatric 
hospital based on application made by his parent). 
 159. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l., 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding unconstitutional 
statute prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to persons under sixteen); Danforth, 428 
U.S. at 74 (prohibiting state from conditioning minors’ access to abortion on parental 
consent). 
 160. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Bellotti, 443 U.S. 622. The Court 
has stated that a “bypass” option should permit an adolescent to obtain an abortion without 
parental consent or notice if she establishes that she is mature enough to make the decision 
independently, or if the decision maker determines that an abortion would be in her best 
interests. Id. at 643–44. 
 161. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643. See also Katheryn D. Katz, The Pregnant Child’s Right 
to Self-Determination, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1119, 1131–32 (1999). 
 162. The Court has held that states must provide children procedural rights necessary to 
ensure the “fundamental fairness” guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. In re Gault, 387 
U.S. 1, 30–31 (1967) (citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966)). The Court in 
Gault required that juveniles charged with committing delinquent acts receive basic due 
process protections, including the privilege against self-incrimination, rights to counsel, notice 
of charges, and ability to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Gault, 387 U.S. at 10, 
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recognizes adolescents’ decision-making abilities in the context of 
decisions affecting their intimate lives, it explicitly recognizes their 
continuing cognitive and decision-making deficiencies in the context 
of their delinquent and criminal conduct. Thus in Roper v. Simmons, 
the Court prohibited imposition of the death penalty for juveniles 
younger than eighteen.163 In support of its decision, the Roper Court 
reviewed and cited research in developmental psychology describing 
typical characteristics of adolescents. These characteristics—including 
immaturity, susceptibility to external pressure, and still-developing 
identities—mitigate adolescents’ criminal culpability, compared to 
adults.164 The research relied on by the Court demonstrates that 
adolescents are different from adults in ways that directly bear on the 
regulation of crime and juvenile justice policy.165 The Court later 
relied on Roper’s assessment of the lesser culpability of adolescent 
offenders when it decided Graham v. Florida, in which it prohibited 
 
13. See also, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (interpreting the Due Process Clause in 
juvenile delinquency cases to require the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof); 
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600–01 (1948) (holding that persons under eighteen 
prosecuted in the adult criminal justice system retain basic constitutional rights in those 
proceedings). But see Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (holding that pretrial 
preventive detention of juveniles does not constitute punishment, in part because “juveniles, 
unlike adults, are always in some form of custody”); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 
545 (1971) (holding that right to jury trial not required by Due Process Clause during the 
adjudicative stage of juvenile proceedings). 
 163. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 164. Id. at 569–70 (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of 
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death 
Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003) [hereinafter Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty 
by Reason of Adolescence]; Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental 
Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339 (1992) [hereinafter Arnett, Reckless Behavior in 
Adolescence]. Elizabeth Scott, a professor of law, and Laurence Steinberg, a professor of 
psychology, have together and separately published numerous influential articles on adolescent 
development and the juvenile justice system. See, e.g., ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE 
STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE (2008) [hereinafter SCOTT & STEINBERG, 
RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE]; Elizabeth Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 
TEX. L. REV. 799 (2003). Scott has also addressed adolescence itself as a legal construct. See 
Elizabeth Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547 (2000) 
[hereinafter Scott, Legal Construction of Adolescence]. 
 165. See generally Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence, supra note 164; Steinberg & 
Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence, supra note 164. But see generally Terry A. Maroney, 
The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 89 
(2009) (arguing that, despite the attention generated by the Supreme Court’s discussion of 
adolescent brain development in Roper, the potential implications of the science of 
development for juvenile justice are, and should be, limited).  
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sentencing juvenile non-homicide offenders to life imprisonment 
without parole.166 
The Court may appear to contradict itself by differently assessing 
adolescent capacity in the privacy/medical decision-making and 
juvenile justice contexts. The next Part (IV.C), however, surveys 
research on adolescent decision-making capacities and deficiencies 
that supports the Court’s approach.167 
To the extent that researchers can reliably identify certain 
contexts in which adolescents are likely to make competent 
decisions, and others in which they are less likely to do so, 
developmental science might usefully inform law or policy. 
Understanding the sorts of decisions individuals have the capacity to 
make, and the ages at which they develop the capacity to make them, 
can help ensure that young citizens get the liberties they are capable 
of exercising. Understanding their decision-making deficiencies may 
help prevent immature citizens from getting liberties that they may 
not yet be competent to handle. A basic understanding of the 
development of decision-making competence may thus better equip 
state actors to make specific policies or render judgments appropriate 
to those whom the policies or judgments will affect. 
There is more to development than the acquisition of decision-
making competence, however. State actors who understand 
developmental processes more generally may additionally find that 
understanding those processes (their timing, the factors that 
influence them, etc.) alerts them to policymaking opportunities 
where they might act selectively yet effectively to further the state’s 
policy goals with respect to its developing citizens. The policies 
advanced in Part V respecting the parent-child relationship and 
education seek to achieve this sort of coherence and efficacy. 
C. The Science(s) of Development 
This Part discusses cognitive development, from infancy through 
emerging adulthood. Those who study development approach the 
rapidly developing field from multiple disciplines (developmental 
 
 166.  130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 167.  See Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults?, Minors’ 
Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop”, 6 AMER. 
PSYCH. 583 (2009) [hereinafter Steinberg et al., Less Mature Than Adults?] (describing 
research on psychological development that supports the Supreme Court’s decisions in both 
Hodgson and Roper). 
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psychology, cognitive neuroscience, etc.)168 and study developmental 
processes at multiple levels (behavioral, psychological, biological, 
etc.). 169 This survey accordingly draws on a range of disciplines and 
analytical approaches from within developmental science. While law 
and policy formally operate at the behavioral level, explaining 
developmental processes at other analytical levels can shed light on 
behavioral phenomena and potentially inform ways in which policy 
might shape it. For example, a neurobiological explanation of the 
experience-dependent maturational processes of early childhood 
might inform the most effective timing and nature of early 
educational interventions. 
A comprehensive, technical discussion of cognitive development 
is beyond the scope of this Article (and the expertise of its author). 
Its more modest aim is to describe aspects of development that can 
and ought to be understood—and, where appropriate, accounted 
for—by those concerned with law and policy affecting the immature. 
The survey gives special attention to two aspects of cognitive 
development: The first is the effect of external influence on 
development. Human development occurs, of course, not in a neural 
vacuum but within an environmental and experiential context. 
Researchers have long known that that environment and experience 
can enrich, or constrain, the neurobiological and cognitive 
development that occurs in infancy and early childhood.170 But only 
in the last decade or so have they begun to develop a similarly 
sophisticated understanding of the developmental mechanisms that 
take place later—in adolescence and beyond—and to consider the 
 
 168.  See., e.g., Laurence Steinberg, A Behavioral Scientist Looks at the Science of 
Adolescent Brain Development, 72 BRAIN & COGNITION 160, 160 (2010) [hereinafter, 
Steinberg, Adolescent Brain Development]; James P. Byrnes, Cognitive Development During 
Adolescence, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENCE 227 (Gerald R. Adams & Michael 
D. Berzonsky eds., 2003). 
 169. Significant overlap and cross-fertilization occur among these approaches. To give 
just one example, in Adolescent Brain Development, developmental psychologist Laurence 
Steinberg describes advances in the developmental neuroscience of adolescence that might be 
“of special interest to those who study adolescent behavioral development.” Steinberg, 
Adolescent Brain Development, supra note 168, at 160. 
 170. See, e.g., William T. Greenough, James E. Black, & Christopher S. Wallace, 
Experience and Brain Development, 58 CHILD DEV. 539 (1987). See also, Eric I. Knudsen et 
al., Economic, Neurobiological, and Behavioral Perspectives on Building America’s Future 
Workforce, 103 PNAS 10,155, 10,155–60 (2006) (surveying studies across various disciplines 
concluding that early childhood experience influences later capacity for economic productivity, 
temperament and social development, perceptual and cognitive abilities, brain architecture, and 
gene expression and neurochemistry). 
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potential effects of experience on these later developments in brain 
structure and function.171 Understanding these effects might inform 
the educational or other experiences the state may wish its 
developing citizens to have. Whether/how to actualize its preference 
will then depend on the whole range of considerations that attend 
any policymaking decision. 
The second aspect of development that will receive special 
attention here relates to changes over time in distinct mental 
capacities and deficiencies that relate to decision making, and the 
factors that support or hinder individuals’ performance.172 As noted 
above, understanding the developmental trajectory of these capacities 
can shed light on the types of decisions otherwise-immature 
individuals might competently make, and the ages at which they are 
most likely to become capable of making them. Conversely, 
understanding deficiencies may prompt a reevaluation of other 
liberties individuals may currently exercise, despite their incapacity to 
do so responsibly. 
Developmental mechanisms involve some combination of (1) 
genetically-driven neural processes, (2) the full range of 
environmental conditions within which development occurs, and (3) 
individual experiences during the course of development.173 
The following sections outline significant aspects of 
developmental processes, first in infancy and childhood, then 
through adolescence and into emerging adulthood. 
 
 171. Steinberg, Adolescent Brain Development, supra note 168, at 160–61. Steinberg 
observes that, in the last decade, “the developmental neuroscience of adolescence has matured 
from a field in its infancy to one that is now approaching its own adolescence.” Id. See also, 
Laurence Steinberg, Cognitive and Affective Development in Adolescence, 9 TRENDS IN COG. 
SCI. 69, 73 (2005) [hereinafter, Steinberg, Cognitive and Affective Development]. Researchers 
have begun to posit that emerging adulthood is a distinct developmental period spanning ages 
eighteen to twenty-five. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 172. For discussions of the capacities employed in decision making, see infra Part IV.C.2; 
SCOTT & STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 164, at 36. See generally 
NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL POLARIZATION 
AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 52–59 (2010). 
 173. Sharon E. Fox, Pat Levitt & Charles A. Nelson III, How the Timing and Quality of 
Early Experiences Influence the Development of Brain Architecture, 81 CHILD DEV. 28, 31 
(2010); Arthur W. Toga et al., Mapping Brain Maturation, 29 TRENDS IN NEUROSCIENCES 
148, 148 (2006). 
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1. Infancy and childhood 
Beginning early in gestation, genetic scripts orchestrate the 
highly structured development of the central nervous system in a 
process that is relatively impervious to experience or environment.174 
Well before birth, the brain’s basic structures and nerve cells are in 
place.175 
Following birth, genetically-driven neural development in 
significant respects gives way to experience-driven neural 
development.176 Postnatal experiences that range from exposure to 
ubiquitous environmental information (like the constantly shifting 
contrasts and patterns that are the visual input from one’s 
surroundings) to the acquisition of specific information unique to 
the individual’s environment stimulate the physiological activity that 
will sculpt the still-forming brain.177 Thus “extrinsic sensory cues are 
essential for the proper development of neural circuitry during early 
postnatal life.”178 Researchers have gained significant, though still 
incomplete, understanding of the processes by which early 
experiences influence both the structure and function of the 
developing brain.179 A brief description of these follows. 
Some of the most critical (and well-studied) changes in the brain 
take place in the cerebral cortex, which handles many of the brain’s 
functions, such as vision, hearing, speech, planning, and emotional 
control.180 Distinct cortical regions specialize in processing different 
 
 174. Fox et al., supra note 173, at 29–31. These mechanisms are not altogether 
impervious to environmental influences, however, and prenatal exposure to drugs, alcohol, 
toxins, etc. may disrupt the expression of genes that regulate early development. Id. at 30–31. 
 175. Susan L. Andersen, Trajectories of Brain Development: Point of Vulnerability or 
Window of Opportunity?, 27 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 3, 4–5 (2003); Charles 
A. Nelson, Change and Continuity in Neurobehavioral Development: Lessons from the Study of 
Neurobiology and Neural Plasticity, 22 INFANT BEHAV. & DEV. 415, 416–20 (1999). 
 176. Fox et al., supra note 173, at 29–31. 
 177. In an influential series of papers in the mid-1980s, William Greenough and 
colleagues first outlined these processes. See, e.g., Greenough et al., supra note 170, at 540. 
 178. Steven W. Flavell & Michael E. Greenberg, Signaling Mechanisms Linking Neuronal 
Activity to Gene Expression and Plasticity of the Nervous System, 31 ANN. REV. NEUROSCIENCE 
563, 564 (2008). 
 179. Fox et al., supra note 173, at 31 The genetic code thus provides the initial blueprint 
for brain structure, but “it must be understood as a framework upon which many 
environmental factors influence future structure and function.” Id. 
 180. Tomas Paus, Mapping Brain Maturation and Cognitive Development During 
Adolescence, 9 TRENDS IN COG. SCI. 60, 60 (2005) [hereinafter Paus, Mapping Brain 
Maturation]. 
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types of information.181 Nerve cells, or neurons, transmit information 
throughout the brain in the form of electrical or chemical impulses. 
A typical neuron consists of a cell body that develops two types of 
branching filaments—dendrites, which receive impulses from 
adjoining neurons, and an axon, which in turn transmits impulses on 
to the next neuron.182 The point of contact between two neurons is 
called a synapse. Some synapses pass electric current from the axon of 
one neuron to a dendrite of the next; other synapses trigger the 
release of chemical “messengers” (e.g., neurotransmitters) which 
then stimulate receiving neurons.183 
The brain initially produces an overabundance of relatively 
unstable synaptic connections.184 When an individual then 
experiences stimulation from her environment, that sensory 
experience stimulates neuronal activity—the electrical or chemical 
impulses that process sensory stimuli; neuronal activity in turn 
activates the synaptic connections.185 It is only after a synapse has 
been repeatedly activated that it strengthens and stabilizes.186 
Unused or infrequently used synapses eventually regress and 
disappear.187 This activity-dependent process, known as “synaptic 
pruning,” improves the speed and efficiency of information 
processing and computational capacity within regional neural 
 
 181. Id. 
 182. Flavell & Greenberg, supra note 178, at 565–66. 
 183. CHARLES A. NELSON ET AL., NEUROSCIENCE OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: THE 
ROLE OF EXPERIENCE AND THE DEVELOPING BRAIN 24 (2006). 
 184. See Flavell & Greenberg, supra note 178, at 566 (discussing synaptic activity at the 
neuromuscular junction, the synapse formed by motor neurons onto muscle cells); Gert 
Westermann et al., Neuroconstructivism, 10 DEV. SCI. 75, 76–77 (2007) (discussing synaptic 
activity in areas of the primary visual cortex). See also, Rhoshel K. Lenroot & Jay N. Giedd, 
Brain Development in Children and Adolescents: Insights from Anatomical Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging, 30 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 718, 719–20 (2006). The 
proliferation and organization of synapses begin around the twentieth week of gestation. Id. at 
719. Synaptic density peaks at different times in different regions of the brain. Id. at 719–20. 
In the visual cortex, for example, maximum density occurs at four months after birth; in the 
medial prefrontal cortex, it does not occur until age three to four. Id. 
 185. Flavell & Greenberg, supra note 178, at 565–67. Under experimental conditions, 
synaptic connections can form in the absence of physiological activity, but in general, 
“experience is essential for the normally occurring regulation of . . . synapse formation.” Fox et 
al., supra note 173, at 31; Toga et al., supra note 173, at 148. 
 186. NELSON ET AL., supra note 183, at 27. 
 187. Flavell & Greenberg, supra note 178, at 566. 
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circuitry (such as the visual or auditory cortex).188 Synaptic pruning is 
a critical component of neural maturation; it “makes the brain more 
efficient by allowing it to change structurally in response to the 
demands of the environment . . . [and] results in increased 
specialization of brain regions.”189 
Neural connections that survive the pruning process typically 
become encased in a sheath of myelin, an insulating lipo-protein.190 
This process, known as myelination, significantly increases the speed 
of impulse transmission (as much as 100-fold) along existing neural 
connections.191 Myelination enables functionally distinct regions of 
the brain to efficiently integrate their functioning across a widely 
distributed neural circuitry, thus supporting complex behavior.192 
Synaptic overproduction and pruning and myelination are the 
primary processes by which neural circuits mature. The proliferation, 
stabilization, and pruning of synapses establish neural connections 
 
 188. Charles Geier & Beatriz Luna, The Maturation of Incentive Processing and Cognitive 
Control, 93 PHARMACOLOGY, BIOCHEMISTRY & BEHAV. 212, 216 (2009); Flavell & 
Greenberg, supra note 178, at 566 (noting that only “a subset of [excess] synapses are 
strengthened while others are eliminated. This elimination process depends on sensory 
experience and synaptic activity”). See also, NELSON ET AL., supra note 183, at 31; Beatriz 
Luna, Developmental Changes in Cognitive Control Through Adolescence, in ADVANCES IN 
CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR 233, 237–38 (Patricia Bauer, ed., 2009) [hereinafter 
Luna, Developmental Changes]; Toga et al., supra note 173, at 148. 
 189. Sara B. Johnson et al., Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The Promise and Pitfalls of 
Neuroscience Research in Adolescent Health Policy, 45 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 216, 217 
(2009). On brain images, synapses and neural cell bodies appear as “gray matter” (and are 
often referred to as such), whose volume or density researchers measure to determine the 
course of neural maturation. See Nitin Gogtay & Paul M. Thompson, Mapping Gray Matter 
Development: Implications for Typical Development and Vulnerability to Psychopathology, 72 
BRAIN & COGNITION 6, 7 (2010). Gray-matter density decreases to mature adult levels earliest 
in areas that process the most basic functions, such as sensory and motor skills. Toga et al., 
supra note 173, at 149–50. See generally Tomas Paus, Growth of White Matter in the Adolescent 
Brain: Myelin or Axon?, 72 BRAIN & COGNITION 26, 31–32 (2010) [hereinafter Paus, Growth 
of White Matter]. The visual cortex (located in the occipital lobe of the cerebral cortex), for 
example, reaches maturity by age seven; the auditory cortex (in the temporal lobe), by age 
twelve. Luna, Developmental Changes, supra note 188, at 237. 
 190. Johnson et al., supra note 189, at 217. 
 191. Toga et al., supra note 173, at 148. 
 192. Luna, Developmental Changes, supra note 188, at 238–39. On brain images, 
myelinated axons show up as measurable “white matter”. Paus, Growth of White Matter, supra 
note 189, at 7 (reporting increasing volume of white matter in a study of individuals from ages 
five to twenty-five years of age); Vincent J. Schmithorst & Weihong Yuan, White Matter 
Development During Adolescence as Shown by Diffusion MRI, 72 BRAIN & COGNITION 16, 19 
(2010) (reporting increase in volume and density of white matter up to “young adulthood”). 
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within and between cortical regions.193 Myelination significantly 
improves these connections, with its dramatic effects most apparent 
along the extensive neural circuits that connect distant cortical 
regions.194 
Synaptic overproduction and pruning occur at different, 
genetically-programmed times in the various regions and neural 
circuits of the brain. These defined periods of circuit maturation are 
generally referred to as “sensitive” periods, during which a circuit’s 
synapses are especially receptive to stabilization by appropriate 
external stimuli.195 Connections not activated by the individual’s 
activity and environment during the sensitive period will likely be 
weakened or lost.196 Thus, “[i]n the process of synaptic pruning, . . . 
the environment determines which synapses will be kept and which 
will not be needed[,] but biological mechanisms determine the times 
in development when different parts of the brain will be most 
affected.”197 
Studies confirm the importance of appropriate environmental 
and sensory experience during sensitive periods.198 In landmark 
studies of the visual system, for example, vision occlusion in one eye 
shortly after birth led to the elimination of neural connections 
between the disadvantaged eye and the visual cortex.199 When the 
visual occlusion extended beyond the sensitive period (after which 
that neural circuit had matured), the major effects were irreversible; 
the neural circuit did not develop normal architecture and function, 
even after restoration of visual input to the disadvantaged eye.200 
 
 193. Schmithorst & Yuan, supra note 192, at 27. See also, Toga et al., supra note 173, at 
149–50 (discussing the use of cortical mapping to study developmental processes). 
 194. Paus, Growth of White Matter, supra note 189, at 7; Schmithorst & Yuan, supra note 
192, at 27. 
 195. Luna, Developmental Changes, supra note 188, at 235. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. See Andrea Berger et al., Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Attention and the 
Development of Self-Regulation, 82 PROGRESS IN NEUROBIOLOGY 256, 263–64 (2007) 
(discussing studies). See generally NELSON ET AL., supra note 183. 
 199. Fox et al., supra note 173, at 31–32 (discussing a series of studies conducted in the 
mid-1960s by Wiesel and Hubel and reported in T.N. Wiesel & D.H. Hubel, Extent of 
Recovery from the Effects of Visual Deprivation in Kittens, 28 J. NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 1060 
(1965), and T.N. Wiesel & D.H. Hubel, Single-cell responses in Striate Cortex of Kittens 
Deprived of Vision in One Eye, 26 J. NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 1003 (1963)). 
 200. Berger et al., supra note 198, at 263. 
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Relevant sensory experience during sensitive periods thus supports, 
and its absence constrains, normal development.201 
Developmental scientists study the trajectory of development at 
different analytical levels. At the cognitive level, the development of 
basic sensory and motor skills precedes the maturation of higher-
order executive skills and association processes (which include 
attention and language processes and sensorimotor integration).202 
The higher-order processes continue to develop into adolescence.203 
Development at the neurobiological level parallels the course of 
cognitive development. Thus, within a given neural hierarchy, the 
neural circuits that process lower level or more basic information 
mature before those that process higher-level information. In the 
visual neural hierarchy, for example, the low-level circuits that 
analyze color or motion mature before the high-level circuits that 
analyze faces.204 
Normal development of the low-level circuits supports 
development of higher-level circuits. To give another example from 
the visual system, studies found that when congenital cataracts 
caused early visual deprivation, subtle but permanent deficits 
remained in the later-developing ability to process faces—even when 
the cataracts were removed in the first months of life.205 The later-
developing perceptual processes thus build on the earlier normal 
development of the basic visual system.206 The process where initial 
learning can constrain later learning, referred to as entrenchment, 
also occurs in the development of other systems, including speech.207 
 
 201. Fox et al., supra note 173, at 32. Another well-studied example of a complex 
cognitive ability shaped by early experience is language acquisition. Young children readily 
acquire native proficiency in a second language, whereas adults acquire a second language only 
with great effort—and the level of proficiency is never as fluent or complete as with early-
acquired language. Knudsen et al., supra note 170, at 10157–59. 
 202. Schmithorst & Yuan, supra note 192, at, 17, 19. See also, Luna, Developmental 
Changes, supra note 188, at 238. In the visual cortex, for example, synaptic pruning is 
complete by preschool age, whereas in the medial prefrontal cortex, substantial pruning does 
not occur until mid- to late-adolescence. Evidence also suggests that synaptic pruning occurs 
into adolescence in “association areas” that connect different regions of the brain and, like 
myelination, support complex integration of function. Luna, Developmental Changes, supra 
note 188, at 238–39. 
 203. Luna, Developmental Changes, supra note 188, at 237–38. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 32. 
 206. Fox et al., supra note 173, at 32. 
 207. Id. 
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The genetic and neurobiological bases of sensitive periods, along 
with the hierarchical development of neural circuits that leads to 
entrenchment, help explain the importance to an individual’s 
development of environment and experience, and the importance of 
receiving appropriate experiences at developmentally appropriate 
times. 
Direct observations of the long-term effects of early experiences 
typically occur at the behavioral level.208 For example, studies of the 
long-term effects of high-quality early intervention programs for 
disadvantaged children—variously including high-quality foster care, 
day care, and early childhood education programs—found dramatic 
increases in intelligence quotients and other positive social and 
economic outcomes later in life.209 Researchers have posited that 
“[l]ow-level circuits whose architecture was shaped by healthy 
experiences early in life provide high-level circuits with precise, high-
quality information. High-quality information, combined with 
sophisticated experience later in life, allows the architecture of 
circuits involved in higher functions to take full advantage of their 
genetic potential.”210 
Developmental neuroscientists studying later-occurring brain 
maturation have discovered that significant growth and change 
continues throughout adolescence and into early adulthood.211 The 
following Part discusses both behavioral and neurobiological 
characteristics of this later period of development. 
2. Adolescence and emerging adulthood 
Adolescence is the developmental period between childhood and 
adulthood and is commonly characterized as spanning ages twelve to 
seventeen.212 Universal characteristics of adolescent behavior include 
increased risk taking, sensation seeking, and impulsivity.213 During 
 
 208. Id. at 34–35. 
 209. Id. (citing study in which children institutionalized at birth were placed in high-
quality foster care before the age of two years); Knudsen et al., supra note 170, at 10155–56 
(citing studies in which disadvantaged children were placed in different intervention programs, 
either at preschool age or approximately four months). 
 210. Fox et al., supra note 173, at 35. 
 211. Johnson et al., supra note 189, at 216; Steinberg, Cognitive and Affective 
Development in Adolescence, supra note 171, at 69–70. 
 212. Geier & Luna, supra note 188, at 212. 
 213. Johnson et al., supra note 189, at 218. 
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this period, a host of undesirable behavior patterns—alcohol and 
substance abuse, criminal activity, reckless driving, smoking, etc.—
tends to make its unfortunate debut.214 Adolescents and young 
adults are more likely than adults over twenty-five to binge drink, 
engage in violence, commit crimes, have casual sex, and suffer 
serious or fatal automobile accidents, most of which they cause by 
driving under the influence of alcohol or engaging in other risky 
driving behaviors.215 
Developmental scientists argue that the emergence of these sorts 
of adolescent behaviors makes “perfect evolutionary sense,” since 
sensation seeking and risk taking have presumably long motivated 
adolescents of all cultures and species to leave their natal 
environments and seek out mates.216 Scientists acknowledge that in 
today’s society, however, the behaviors that express this 
developmental pattern, despite having been selected for by 
evolution, “may be deemed inappropriate.”217 Whatever their 
origins, public health experts today agree that reducing adolescent 
risk-taking behaviors would improve society’s overall well-being.218 
Behavioral decision models initially posited that adolescents’ 
cognitive deficiencies led them to misperceive risks and disregard the 
long-term consequences of their behavior.219 Accordingly, state 
interventions sought to correct their misperceptions by educating 
adolescents about commonly encountered risks. These education 
efforts often included skills components, in which adolescents 
learned practical methods for dealing with situations presenting risk 
 
 214. Valerie F. Reyna & Frank Farley, Risk and Rationality in Adolescent Decision 
Making: Implications for Theory, Practice, and Public Policy, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 1, 8 
(2006). See also, Michael Windle and Rebecca C. Windle, Alcohol and Other Substance Use and 
Abuse, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENCE 450–63 (Gerald R. Adams and Michael 
D. Berzonsky eds., 2003) (reporting empirical studies on initiation and escalation of substance 
use among adolescents). 
 215. Laurence Steinberg, A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent Risk-Taking, 28 
DEVELOPMENTAL REVIEW 78, 79 (2008) [hereinafter Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking]. 
 216.  Steinberg, Adolescent Brain Development, supra note 168, at 161; B.J. Casey et al., 
The Adolescent Brain, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 62, 70 (2008). 
 217.  Casey et al., supra note 216, at 70. Authors of a review of adolescent risk taking 
eschew the understatement that characterizes Casey et al.’s characterization of the 
contemporary effects of risk taking, observing that the “decisions that are encouraged by 
evolution appear to make people stupid in the modern world, . . . and they encourage 
unhealthy risk taking rather than discourage it.” Reyna & Farley, supra note 214, at 4. 
 218.  Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 215, at 79. See also, Reyna & Farley, 
Risk & Rationality, supra note 214, at 8. 
 219.  Reyna & Farley, Risk & Rationality, supra note 214, at 33. 
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(e.g., role playing ways in which to reject proposed sexual activity).220 
Studies of these well-intended interventions, however, have found 
them to be largely ineffectual in changing adolescent behavior.221 
The early behavioral models, moreover, have failed to find 
empirical support. Researchers have sought to identify cognitive 
differences between adolescents and adults that could explain their 
different propensities for risk-taking behavior. Examples of such 
differences could include, for example, higher levels of irrationality 
among adolescents, lower levels of risk aversion, or deficiencies in 
either information processing or risk perception relative to adults.222 
None of these efforts, however, has borne empirical fruit. 
To the contrary, researchers have consistently found that “[t]he 
logical reasoning and basic information-processing abilities of 16-
year-olds are comparable to”223 or “essentially indistinguishable” 224 
from those of adults. General cognitive capacity—i.e., the abilities to 
process information, understand and reason from facts, and assess 
and appreciate the nature of a given situation—improves into mid-
adolescence.225 By age sixteen, these basic cognitive abilities are 
mature. 
Researchers have thus reached the counterintuitive conclusion 
that adolescents engage in higher rates of risky, seemingly irrational 
behavior than do adults despite being “as knowledgeable, logical, 
reality-based, and accurate in the ways in which they think about 
risky activity . . . as their elders.”226 Cognitive deficiencies thus do 
 
 220.  Id. 
 221.  Id. at 33 (citing studies). 
 222.  Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 215, at 80. 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  Id. See also, R. MURRAY THOMAS, COMPARING THEORIES OF CHILD 
DEVELOPMENT 298–99 (3d ed. 1992); Steinberg, Cognitive and Affective Development, supra 
note 171, at 70; June Carbone, Age Matters: Class, Family Formation, and Inequality, 48 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 901, 911–12 (2008); Staci A. Gruber & Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd, 
Neurobiology and the Law: A Role in Juvenile Justice?, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 321, 324 (2006); 
Beatriz Luna et al., Maturation of Cognitive Processes from Late Childhood to Adulthood, 75 
CHILD DEV. 1357 (2004); Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 164, at 812–13. 
  Compared to children and preadolescents, adolescents develop increased cognitive 
abilities, including improved executive function, which refers to the higher-order cognitive 
system that manages other cognitive functions such as abstract thinking, planning (e.g., 
thinking through the likely consequences of actions), and inhibiting (or executing) behavior. 
SCOTT & STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 164, at 44. 
 225. Steinberg et al., Less Mature Than Adults?, supra note 167, at 590–92. 
 226. Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 215, at 80. 
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not account for adolescents’ propensity for risky and impulsive 
decision making, with studies confirming that adolescents have the 
cognitive competence to make rational decisions about risks.227 Why, 
then, do they frequently fail to do so? 
Behavioral scientists have examined more closely the real-world 
contexts in which adolescents make decisions, and in so doing they 
have gained valuable insights into differences between adolescent 
and adult decision-making processes. Their findings do not challenge 
adolescents’ competence to make rational decisions about risks—at 
least when that decision making occurs in the relatively ideal 
conditions of the research laboratories in which adolescents complete 
tasks involving minor, symbolic risks.228 The real world seldom 
presents ideal conditions, however, and researchers have found that 
the real-world contexts in which adolescents make decisions can 
drastically affect the quality of their decision making.229 
Contexts found to predictably compromise adolescent decision 
making include those requiring them to make decisions “in the heat 
of passion, in the presence of peers, on the spur of the moment, in 
unfamiliar situations, . . . [and] when behavioral inhibition is 
required for good outcomes.”230 In other words, adolescents tend to 
make bad decisions in emotionally charged or pressured situations, 
and they struggle to control impulses that lead to undesirable 
behavior. Studies of their decision making have more generally 
shown that, even though they do not generally misperceive risks (if 
anything, studies have tended to show that adolescents and adults 
both overestimate risk), adolescents tend to weight and value 
benefits more heavily than risks, as compared to adults.231 
Developmental scientists are rapidly gaining a better 
understanding of neurobiological aspects of adolescent development 
 
 227. Reyna & Farley, supra note 214, at 2. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 1; Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk 
Preference, and Risky Decision Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 
41 DEV. PSYCH. 625, 625 (2005). 
 230. Id. See also, Eric Amsel et al., Anticipating and Avoiding Regret as a Model of 
Adolescent Decision-Making, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 
IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 119, 120 (Janis E. Jacobs & Paul A. Klaczynski eds., 2005). 
Researchers of cognitive ability have referred to this as the “competence-performance 
distinction.” Jennifer L. Woolard et al., Theoretical and Methodological Issues in Studying 
Children’s Capacities in Legal Contexts, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 219, 220 (1996) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 231. Reyna & Farley, supra note 214, at 1. 
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that have the potential to explain its most confounding behavioral 
aspect—the increase during adolescence in both irrational risk-taking 
behavior and rational decision-making capacity.232 Developmental 
psychologist Laurence Steinberg has recently emphasized 
importance—to all disciplines within developmental science—of 
research in developmental neuroscience, suggesting that this research 
has the “potential to structure a new, overarching model of 
normative . . . adolescent development.”233 
Scientists have thus begun developing a neurologically-based 
model primarily oriented around the development in two neural 
systems: that associated with cognitive control, and that associated 
with socio-emotional maturity. The core insight of this model, which 
some call the “dual systems model,” is that the neural systems 
associated with cognitive control on the one hand, and those 
associated with socio-emotional maturity on the other, develop 
along different timelines.234 This temporal disjunction has the 
potential to explain (1) adolescents’ risk taking and poor decision 
making despite their improved cognitive ability, (2) other aspects of 
adolescent psychology and behavior, such as heightened 
susceptibility to peer influence, and (3) the developmental trajectory 
of all these over the course of the adolescent’s transition to 
adulthood.235 An overview of the model’s features follows. 
The first neural system of the dual systems model is what some 
researchers refer to as the socio-emotional system; it includes neural 
circuitries across regions of the brain implicated in aspects of social 
 
 232. Casey et al., supra note 216, at 63 (discussing cognitive and neurobiological 
hypotheses that fail to adequately account for adolescent decision-making behavior). 
 233. Steinberg, Adolescent Brain Development, supra note 168, at 162. See generally 
Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 215. 
 234. Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 215, at 97–98. See also, Laurence 
Steinberg, Dustin Albert, Marie Banich, Elizabeth Cauffman, & Sandra Graham, Age 
Differences in Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity as Indexed by Behavior and Self-Report: 
Evidence for a Dual Systems Model, 44 DEV. PSYCH 1764, 1764 (2008) [hereinafter Steinberg 
et al., Sensation Seeking & Impulsivity] (noting that [n]eurobiological evidence in support of 
the dual systems model is rapidly accumulating”). 
 235. See infra notes 236–50, and accompanying text. For slightly different versions of the 
dual systems model, see Casey et al., supra note 216; Geier & Luna, supra note 188. See also, 
Catherine Sebastian et al., Social Brain Development and the Affective Consequences of Ostracism 
in Adolescence, 72 BRAIN & COGNITION 134, 138 (2010) (discussing aspects of the dual 
systems model). 
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information processing and reward seeking/processing.236 The 
second neural system is the cognitive control system. Cognitive 
control refers to the abilities to voluntarily coordinate and engage in 
goal-directed behavior. This system includes the prefrontal cortex, 
which is involved in executive function, decision making, and self-
regulatory functions, and “association” areas, which connect 
different regions of the brain and thus support the complex 
integration of function.237 
In the socio-emotional system, the neurotransmitter dopamine 
modulates the neural reward circuitry.238 (Recall that when 
stimulated by a chemical impulse, certain neurons trigger the release 
of neurotransmitters that then chemically stimulate the next neuron 
in the circuit.)239 The mechanisms underlying dopamine 
neurotransmission continue to mature during adolescence. 
Dopaminergic activity peaks rapidly and dramatically in early 
adolescence, around the time of pubertal maturation.240 Researchers 
believe that this peak in activity makes adolescents experience a 
potentially rewarding stimuli as even more rewarding than would be 
the case during either childhood or adulthood.241 The resulting 
heightening of reward salience leads to increased sensation seeking—
a tendency to seek out novel, varied, and highly stimulating 
experiences, coupled with a willingness to take risks in order to attain 
them.242 Consistent with this theory, studies show that sensation 
 
 236. The socio-emotional system includes the amygdala, nucleus accumbens, 
orbitofrontal cortex, medial prefrontal cortex, superior temporal sulcus. Steinberg, Adolescent 
Risk-Taking, supra note 215, at 83. 
 237. Id. at 93–94. The cognitive control system also includes parts of the corpus 
callosum, which connects the left and right hemispheres. Id. 
 238. Geier & Luna, supra note 188, at 216. 
 239. NELSON ET AL., supra note 183, at 24. 
 240. Steinberg et al., Sensation Seeking & Impulsivity, supra note 234, at 1764–66; Geier 
& Luna, supra note 188, at 216–17. Although the increase in dopaminergic activity tends to 
coincide with puberty, evidence suggests that it occurs independent of puberty. Steinberg, 
Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 215, at 89–90. Oxytocin, another neurotransmitter that 
operates within the socio-emotional network, however, is more directly linked to the rise in 
pubertal hormones. Oxytocin’s functions include regulating sensitivity to social stimuli. 
Gonadal steroid release at puberty leads to changes in oxytocin receptors. Studies have 
confirmed adolescents’ sensitivity to emotional and social stimuli, heightened awareness of 
others’ opinions, and feelings of self-consciousness. Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra 
note 215, at 89–90. 
 241. Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 215, at 85. 
 242. Steinberg et al., Sensation Seeking & Impulsivity, supra note 234, at 1765; 
Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 215, at 85. 
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seeking, risk preference, susceptibility to deviant or anti-social peer 
influence, and reward sensitivity all follow a curvilinear, “∩”-shaped 
trend; they begin to increase at age ten, peak around ages fourteen 
to fifteen (depending on the study and measure used), then 
decline.243 
The cognitive control system follows a more gradual and linear 
developmental trajectory than does the socio-emotional system.244 
Three structural changes in the brain characterize the maturation of 
cognitive control during adolescence: 
First, the synaptic pruning that began in childhood accelerates in 
the prefrontal regions of the brain, with the prefrontal cortex 
maturing in mid-adolescence.245 This correlates with the maturation 
of basic cognitive processes by age sixteen. Second, myelination, 
which improves neural connectivity, continues within the regions of 
the cortex and between the different cortical regions through 
adolescence and into the twenties.246 This change correlates with 
observed behavioral improvements in higher-order and executive 
functions (future orientation, planning, response inhibition, spatial 
working memory) associated with the integrated functioning of 
multiple prefrontal regions.247 And third, myelination also continues 
between the cortex and other regions of the brain, including 
connections between regions involved in social and emotional 
information-processing, and those involved in cognitive control 
 
 243. Steinberg, Adolescent Brain Development, supra note 168, at 163; Sindy R. Sumter 
et al., The Developmental Pattern of Resistance to Peer Influence in Adolescence: Will the 
Teenager Ever Be Able to Resist?, 32 J. ADOLESCENCE 1009–10 (2009). See also, Steinberg et al., 
Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 215, at 89 (ages thirteen to sixteen). See also, Steinberg et 
al., Sensation Seeking, supra note 234, at 1774 (ages twelve and fifteen).  
 244. Steinberg et al., Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 215, at 93. 
 245. Gogtay & Thompson, supra note 189, at 7; Toga et al., supra note 173, at 149–50; 
Paus, Mapping Brain Maturation, supra note 180, at 62. There is also some evidence of 
synaptic pruning in the association areas (areas throughout the brain connecting its different 
regions and supporting the complex integration of inter-regional function). Luna, 
Developmental Changes, supra note 188, at 238. 
 246. Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 215, at 94–96; Geier & Luna, supra 
note 188, at 216; Paus, Growth of White Matter, supra note 189, at 26; Luna, Developmental 
Changes, supra note 188, at 237–41; Gogtay & Thompson, supra note 189, at 7. Because 
myelination involves the gradual enhancement of established connections (as opposed to the 
initial establishment of such connections), the changes in white matter represent a refinement 
of executive control processes that are in place earlier in development. Luna, Developmental 
Changes, supra note 188, at 239–40. 
 247. Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 215, at 94–96. 
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processes (especially the prefrontal regions).248 The increased 
connectivity between these regions correlates with coordination of 
affect (the external expression of emotions) and cognition; the result 
is that emotional regulation and impulse control both improve 
through the mid-twenties.249 Strategic planning, anticipation of 
future consequences, and resistance to neutral (as opposed to anti-
social) peer influence and peer influence in general all follow the 
same trajectory, increasing linearly from preadolescence through late 
adolescence and early adulthood.250 
In summary, adolescents’ basic cognitive abilities are mature by 
age sixteen, giving them the capacity to process information and 
make rational decisions. But the heightened sensitivity to rewards 
that increases and peaks around mid-adolescence inclines them 
towards risk taking, sensation seeking, and impulsivity; these 
inclinations may dominate or overwhelm their cognitive processes 
and shape their behaviors, especially in situations triggering 
heightened emotion or pressure.251 Their susceptibility to these 
confounding influences on their decision making begins to decline 
after mid-adolescence, however, while their abilities to exercise 
cognitive control increases, ultimately reaching mature levels in their 
twenties.252 
While adolescence technically ends at age eighteen or nineteen, 
former adolescents do not reach adult levels of neurobiological or 
behavioral maturity immediately.253 Brain development continues 
well into the mid-twenties, both through synaptic pruning, especially 
 
 248. Id. at 94–98. Important social and emotional information-processing regions of the 
brain include the limbic and paralimbic regions. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. See also, Sumter et al., supra note 243, at 1016 (reporting a steady increase in 
reported resistance to general peer influence with age). See generally Luna et al., What has 
fMRI Told Us About the Development of Cognitive Control Through Adolescence?, 72 BRAIN & 
COGNITION 101, 101 (2010) [hereinafter Luna et al., Development of Cognitive Control]. 
 251. Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 215, at 97–98; Luna, Developmental 
Changes, supra note 188, at 257. 
 252. Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 215, at 97–98; Luna, Developmental 
Changes, supra note 188, at 257. 
 253. Some scholars suggest that United States and most Western cultures view 
adolescence as extending into the early 1920s. See, e.g., Glen R. Elliott & S. Shirley Feldman, 
Capturing the Adolescent Experience, in AT THE THRESHOLD: THE DEVELOPING ADOLESCENT 
1 (S. Shirley Feldman & Glen R. Elliott eds., 1990). Researchers rarely include subjects older 
than eighteen in studies involving adolescents, however, see, e.g., Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, 
Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late Teens Through the Twenties, 55 
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 469, 476 (2000) [hereinafter Arnett, Emerging Adulthood]. 
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in the frontal cortex, and myelination.254 Higher-order executive 
function, emotional regulation, and impulse control also improve 
through the mid-twenties.255 Emerging adults aged eighteen to 
twenty-two demonstrate increased levels of risk taking in the 
presence of peers, compared to older adults (though they are less 
subject to peer influence than are adolescents—in one study, peer 
presence doubled risk-taking among adolescents, increased it by fifty 
percent among emerging adults, and had no effect on adults aged 
twenty-five and older.).256 The continuation of developmental 
processes into the post-adolescent period thus provides 
neurobiological and behavioral support for treating early adulthood 
as a distinct period of development.257 
Professor Jeffrey Arnett, whose study of adolescence was cited by 
the Supreme Court in Roper, has also studied the period immediately 
following adolescence. Arnett and others now characterize ages 
eighteen to twenty-five as a distinct developmental period, which 
they call “emerging adulthood.”258 Arnett argues that while a 
traditional definition of adolescence followed neatly by adulthood 
may be expedient, it fails to capture the complex reality of this period 
of life.259 Emerging adults themselves seem to agree and tend to 
 
 254. See supra notes 245–46 and accompanying text. 
 255. See supra notes 245–50, and accompanying text. 
 256. Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 215, at 90–91; Margo Gardner & 
Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk Preference, and Risky Decision Making 
in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 41 DEV. PSYCHOLOGY 625 (2005). 
 257. Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Mapping Continued Brain Growth and Gray Matter 
Density Reduction in Dorsal Frontal Cortex: Inverse Relationships During Postadolescent Brain 
Maturation, 21 J. NEUROSCIENCE 8819 (2001). 
 258. Arnett, Emerging Adulthood, supra note 253, at 469. See generally JEFFREY JENSEN 
ARNETT, ADOLESCENCE AND EMERGING ADULTHOOD: A CULTURAL APPROACH (4th ed. 
2010); EMERGING ADULTS IN AMERICA: COMING OF AGE IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Jeffrey 
Jensen Arnett & Jennifer Lynn Tanner eds., 2006); JEFFREY JENSEN ARNETT, EMERGING 
ADULTHOOD: THE WINDING ROAD FROM THE LATE TEENS THROUGH THE TWENTIES 
(2004); READINGS ON ADOLESCENCE AND EMERGING ADULTHOOD (Jeffrey Jensen Arnett 
ed., 2002). 
 259. THOMAS P. GULLOTTA ET AL., THE ADOLESCENT EXPERIENCE 17 (4th ed., 2000). 
G. Stanley Hall, who initiated the scientific study of adolescence, began at the beginning of the 
twentieth century with the publication of his two-volume work on the psychology of 
adolescence; he viewed adolescence as extending from age fourteen to age twenty-four. See also 
G. STANLEY HALL, ADOLESCENCE: ITS PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS RELATION TO PHYSIOLOGY, 
ANTHROPOLOGY, SOCIOLOGY, SEX, CRIME, RELIGION, AND EDUCATION (1904). Hall likely 
chose a range bounded by the average ages of the initial changes of puberty and of entry into 
marriage and parenthood. Today researchers view adolescence as starting and ending earlier. 
This may be partly because on one end, the onset of puberty occurs earlier than it did in 1900, 
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regard themselves as neither adolescents nor adults, but instead in 
between the two.260 
At the behavioral level, Arnett characterizes emerging adulthood 
as a time for identity exploration, free from defined social roles and 
expectations. Several of the risky behaviors that emerge during 
adolescence peak during this time, including unprotected sex, 
substance abuse, and high risk driving behaviors (including driving at 
high speeds or while intoxicated).261 Steinberg has argued that 
increases in these behaviors do not necessarily reflect an increasing 
propensity towards risk taking during late adolescence/emerging 
adulthood, but instead the increased opportunities to do so that 
come with aging. After high school, for example, approximately one-
third of emerging adults attend college and spend the next several 
years in a period of semi-autonomy. They assume some of the 
responsibilities of independent living but, they also continue to rely 
on adults for others.262 Approximately forty percent of all emerging 
adults leave their parents’ home but later move back at least for a 
period of time over the course of their late teens and twenties.263 
The next Part considers possible implications of this research. 
3. Conclusions from the science of development 
Research in the various disciplines that study cognitive 
development has advanced tremendously in the last decade or so. 
Some of its insights have already influenced state decision making 
affecting the young.264 Others have significant potential for doing so. 
Yet state actors considering the implications of development for state 
decision making should proceed with care (as they should whenever 
they rely on specialized knowledge from fields outside their 
expertise). With respect to the science of cognitive development in 
 
and on the other because many more people share a significant social transition—high school 
graduation. In 1900, for example, only ten percent of people ages fourteen to seventeen 
attended high school; by 1985, that percentage had risen to ninety-five percent. See also, 
Arnett, Emerging Adulthood, supra note 253, at 476. 
 260. Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Learning to Stand Alone: The Contemporary American 
Transition to Adulthood in Cultural and Historical Context, 41 HUM. DEV. 295 (1998). 
 261. Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence, supra note 164, at 339. 
 262. Arnett, Emerging Adulthood, supra 253, at 471. Other emerging adults, though, 
leave home not to attend college but instead to live independently and work full-time. Id. 
 263. Id. (citing F. Goldscheider & C. Goldscheider, Leaving and Returning Home in 
20th Century America, 48 POPULATION BULL. 1 (1994)). 
 264. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
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particular, state actors must remain aware that development is an 
organic process. As developmental scientists emphasize, the timing 
and pace of normal development varies according to the 
individual.265 Age is only an imperfect proxy for development.266 
Policy making, on the other hand, often requires definite, clearly 
bounded categories. Developmental science may usefully inform but 
cannot determine these.267 It is the state actor who must consciously 
decide the chronological direction in which potential line-drawing 
errors will lie.268 
Keeping these cautions in mind, several conclusions have already 
emerged from the scientific literature which may have significant 
salience for state actors: 
First, it appears that education and experience may be as 
important in adolescence as they have long been understood to be in 
early childhood.269 Given that the synaptic pruning that occurs 
during early childhood is experience-dependent, there is reason to 
believe that the later-occurring synaptic pruning is likewise 
 
 265. See, e.g., Sumter et al., supra note 243, at 1017; Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 
(2010). But see Maroney, supra note 165, at 94 (“[A]dolescent brain science has had, is likely 
to have, and should have only moderate impact in the [juvenile justice] courts.”). 
 266. Id. See also, Steinberg et al., Sensation Seeking & Impulsivity, supra note 234, at 
1776 (cautioning that “[i]t is important to remember . . . that individuals of the same age vary 
in their sensation seeking and impulse control and that variations in these characteristics are 
related to variations in risky and antisocial behavior.”). 
 267. Laurence Steinberg, Should the Science of Adolescent Brain Development Inform 
Public Policy?, AM. PSYCHOLOGIST, Nov. 2009, at 739, 747 (concluding that “[a]ny system of 
boundary drawing that relies on science for guidance, whether neuroscience or behavioral 
science, is bound to be imperfect, but it will nevertheless sit on a stronger foundation than one 
that is ignorant about development.”); Maroney, supra note 165, at 145–56 (discussing 
inherent constraints of developmental neuroscience’s utility in juvenile justice cases, 
emphasizing its inability to inform individual assessments). 
 268. In other words, state actors must evaluate a given context and decide whether it is 
preferable to mistakenly include individuals in the relevant category (e.g., a category that 
presumes the competence of twelve-year-olds to drive will include A, a twelve-year-old who 
has not yet attained driving competence) or mistakenly exclude them from it (e.g., the 
category that presumes the competence of thirteen- but not twelve-year-olds to drive will 
exclude B, a twelve-year-old who has attained driving competence). 
 269. Anne Dailey, for example, has examined the research on the importance of early 
caregiving to psychological development and the implications for constitutional law. Anne C. 
Dailey, Developing Citizens, 91 IOWA L. REV. 431 (2006). Dailey argues that the centrality of 
early caregiving relationships to healthy development supports increased constitutional 
protection for caregiving relationships. Id. 
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experience-dependent.270 Steinberg observed that, if this synaptic 
activity is activity- and experience-dependent, the brain plasticity 
characteristic of this period of adolescence would represent “a time 
of considerable opportunity for intervention.”271 The importance of 
synaptic pruning to development seems to find support in one 
longitudinal study, which found that the developmental trajectory of 
gray matter in children with higher intelligence quotients 
demonstrated higher levels of plasticity, with a “particularly vigorous 
phase of cortical thinning.”272 Without rich educational experiences 
during adolescence, brain development may stall, with the young 
person’s cognitive potential remaining unrealized. 
Second, the ability to reason reaches mature levels by mid-
adolescence, around age sixteen. Psychosocial maturity improves 
throughout adolescence but does not reach mature levels until the 
twenties. The heightened vulnerability to risk taking that peaks in 
middle adolescence before declining is normative; to the extent that 
it has a neurobiological basis, efforts to reduce risk taking through 
education will have limited success. While adolescents have the 
cognitive capacities to make rational decisions, real-world contexts 
and stressors will continue to confound their capacities and impede 
their decision-making. So far, only aging (and, presumably, the 
neural development that attends it) reliably and significantly 
correlates with decreases in adolescent risk taking. As a result of this 
ongoing development, adolescents’ decision-making abilities will be 
both age dependent and context specific.  
Finally, it appears likely that emerging adults do not reach full 
cognitive maturity until their early- to mid-twenties. Indeed, some of 
the decision-making deficiencies and other characteristics typically 
observed in adolescence persist into this stage of life. 
A discussion of the policy implications of this and the previous 
two Parts follows. 
 
 270. The authors of one study argue that “[r]ich early experience must be followed by 
rich and more sophisticated experience later in life, when high-level circuits are maturing in 
order for full potential to be achieved.” Fox et al., supra note 173, at 35. 
 271. Steinberg, A Behavioral Scientist, supra note 168 at 161. See also Luna, 
Developmental Changes, supra note 188, at 268 (suggesting that adolescent experience may 
guide synaptic pruning and thus help determine the specialization of neural circuitries that 
support task ability and response state, which refers to the ability to orchestrate cognitive 
demands). 
 272. Gogtay & Thompson, supra note 189, at 7. 
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V. DEVELOPING CITIZENS 
The previous three Parts have explored the interests and rights of 
parents and the young, and the state’s minimum ends with respect to 
its citizens generally. This Part outlines a set of policies that I argue 
best accounts for these interests and rights. Again, at the core of 
state actions respecting the immature is citizens’ liberty, which is the 
minimum basic end of the liberal constitutional democratic state. 
The dual goals of safeguarding immature citizens’ current liberty and 
their future liberty ground a framework around which to build a set 
of policies that together form a coherent whole. The framework 
defines the primary goal, and the policies enable their realization. 
They in turn should be informed by and account for the interests of 
those most affected by them—parents and young citizens themselves. 
To be clear, these are not the only policies that might flow from 
the analyses of the previous Parts. Rather, they demonstrate that a 
body of policies can be derived from common principles to form a 
transparent, effective, and coherent whole.273 
Part V.A begins by briefly recapitulating the objectives of the 
state, and the interests and rights of parents and the immature. Part 
V.B weighs and synthesizes all these, deriving from them four ends 
that state policies affecting young citizens should aim to achieve. 
Parts V.C and V.D then recommend (and address potential 
objections to) numerous policies that advance those ends, from 
infancy through emerging adulthood. 
 
 273. This approach is consistent with that recently advocated by Emily Buss, at least in 
some respects. In What the Law Should (and Should Not) Learn from Child Development 
Research, Buss criticizes a law-making approach that, informed by developmental science, 
would focus on children’s acquisition of capacities in extending to them specific rights and 
responsibilities. Emily Buss, What the Law Should (and Should Not) Learn from Child 
Development Research, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13 (2009) [hereinafter Buss, Child Development 
Research]. Such an approach, Buss argues, underestimates the complexity involved in 
determining “capacity;” takes an idealized, caricatured view of adult “maturity” that is at odds 
with actual adult functioning; mistakenly assumes that children’s capacities are consistent across 
various contexts; and, by treating children’s capacities as ascertainable at any given point in 
their development, elides the law’s potential to shape their development in a direction 
consistent with society’s goals. Id. It is my goal to avoid these pitfalls. Other arguments raised 
by Buss are less salient here, or I leave their consideration to those involved in decision- and 
policy-making processes. For example, Buss discusses the inevitable mismatches between 
developmental categories (which cannot establish bright lines) and legal categories (which 
often must do so). I contend that these are context-specific assessments that must simply be 
made at that level. Weighing, for example, the potential harms involved by overestimating 
adolescent capacity in a given context against that involved in underestimating that capacity, 
can help state actors determine where the risk of error ought to lie. 
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A. Parents, the Young, and the State, Redux:                              
Interests, Rights, and Ends 
The state’s most basic end is citizens’ liberty; its secondary end is 
its citizenry’s performance of those functions essential to its 
continued existence.274 To ensure citizens’ basic liberty during their 
immaturity, the state must withhold from others absolute authority 
over them. To ensure their basic liberty upon reaching maturity, it 
must prevent others from depriving immature citizens of the ability 
to develop the basic capacities of citizenship.275 
Parents’ interests include the liberty to raise their children as they 
deem best, with as little state interference as possible. Parenthood is 
a highly valued status, and many parents consider forming families 
and childrearing to be part of their self-identities.276 Constitutional 
jurisprudence validates their sentiments by recognizing the right to 
parent as an aspect of parents’ individual liberties. But that same 
jurisprudence restricts the illiberal tendencies of recognizing an 
other-determining liberty by providing it relatively weak 
protection.277 
The needs and abilities of the young change dramatically as they 
develop, and their interests change accordingly. The young require 
care appropriate to the extent of their dependency. They have a 
liberty interest in exercising the rights of which they are capable and 
a welfare interest in being protected from their deficiencies. They 
should receive the experiences and education necessary for them to 
develop the capacities of citizenship, so that they may choose how 
and whether to exercise those capacities once they reach maturity. 
And they should receive the experiences and education necessary for 
them to ultimately choose the courses their lives will take.278 
Their legal status as minors in some instances narrows the scope 
of their constitutional rights, but it does not altogether deny them 
constitutional rights or protections. Some of their liberty and welfare 
interests have received constitutional protections. For example, 
minors are entitled to independently make decisions within their 
competence affecting intimate aspects of their lives. A state that 
 
 274. See supra Part II.A.1–2. 
 275. See supra Part II.B.1–2. 
 276. See supra Part III.A. 
 277. See supra Part III.B. 
 278. See supra Part IV.A. 
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presumes minors’ incapacity in this context and thus seeks to restrict 
their decisional autonomy (by requiring, for example, parental 
notification or consent before a minor may obtain an abortion) must 
also provide affected minors the opportunity to demonstrate their 
capacity—i.e., individualized determinations of the minor’s decision-
making competence.279 Conversely, minors’ interests in being 
protected from their deficiencies requires states to presume and 
account for demonstrated decision-making deficiencies that render 
minors more susceptible to committing criminal offenses, and less 
culpable for those actions.280 
B. Synthesis: Framework to Guide State Decisions                            
Affecting the Immature 
This Part sets out a four-part framework comprising the ends 
that policies affecting the immature should further. It briefly explains 
the way in which each end advances or sacrifices the various 
objectives summarized above and justifies the proposed balance. 
First, the state should afford parents the liberty to form and raise 
a family. Doing so furthers parents’ interests in childrearing and the 
state’s obligation to ensure citizens’ (here, parents’) liberty. By 
encouraging and respecting parental commitment, however, parental 
deference also aims to further the state’s obligation to ensure the 
welfare of the immature.281 Deference to parents admittedly risks 
restricting the current and future liberty of the immature. Some 
parents, for example, may exercise greater control during their 
children’s immaturity than is justified by their dependency, or may 
endeavor to control and thus constrain their children’s future liberty. 
The next part of the framework guards against these risks. 
Second, then, notwithstanding the presumption of parental 
deference, the state must withhold from parents and others absolute 
authority over the immature. The state’s minimum obligation to its 
young citizens—ensuring their basic liberty—precedes its 
commitment to ensuring parents’ specific childrearing liberty and 
thus limits the extent of parental noninterference. The state may 
 
 279. See supra Part IV.B. 
 280. See id. For a critique of the analytical and expressive aspects of the Court’s recent 
jurisprudence relating to juvenile punishment, see Buss, Child Development Research, supra 
note 273, at 42–47. 
 281. See infra Part V.C.1. Noninterference with parenting choices also respects a 
secondary value of the liberal state—pluralism. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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safeguard the basic liberty of immature citizens by exercising its 
parens patriae power. At a minimum, it must prevent others from 
interfering with the young in a way that conclusively decides the 
course of their lives. 
Third, the state must ensure that the immature will reach 
maturity with their basic entitlement to liberty intact. Basic liberty 
entails deciding how one’s life will ultimately go. The state must thus 
endeavor to ensure that children will learn of their basic life options, 
and will develop the abilities they need to pursue them. Because the 
state must accordingly ensure that the young receive certain 
educational experiences, achieving this end may interfere with 
parents’ liberty and even the basic liberty of the young themselves. 
But the state rightly constrains the liberties of both during children’s 
immaturity (e.g., by compelling their school attendance) in order to 
preserve to the young their later life-deciding liberty. 
Fourth, the state must ensure that its citizenry will reach maturity 
with the capacities to fulfill the basic obligations of citizens—the 
ability to contribute to the state’s functioning through work; the 
ability to participate in democratic governance; and the ability to 
form families and raise children and future generations of citizens. 
This end ensures the perpetuation of the state itself and its continued 
ability to preserve citizens’ basic liberty. It simultaneously furthers 
mature citizens’ liberty to choose the types of economic and civic 
participation in which they will engage. Like the third end of the 
framework, this end also requires that the young receive certain 
experiences; achieving it thus means that it too may interfere with 
both parents’ and children’s liberties during the latter’s immaturity. 
Implicit in its third and fourth ends is the notion that, once an 
individual attains the mature capacity to exercise a liberty, the state 
should endeavor to ensure that the individual in fact receives that 
liberty. 
The following two Parts (V.C–D) commend policies that aim to 
further these four ends. 
C. Policies—Infancy and Childhood 
The fundamental policy advocated in this Part is that of minimal 
state interference with the liberty of parents to raise their infants and 
young children as they see fit. Parents should instead receive near-
absolute deference during this period of their children’s 
development, though the state should continue to withhold from 
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them absolute authority over their children. Parents should thus have 
no entitlement to interfere with their children in such a way as to 
ultimately decide their lives—such as withholding medical treatment 
from a critically ill child.282 In addition, states should increase efforts 
to educate parents about the importance of early childhood 
experiences, though these efforts should stop short of mandating 
participation in any specific programs. 
Parental deference in early childhood aims to achieve the first 
two of the four ends above—deferring to parents’ childrearing 
decisions, yet preserving immature citizens’ basic liberty. The 
following two Parts elaborate on these policies and consider 
objections likely to be raised to them. 
1. Minimizing interference in parenting 
The first form of noninterference in parenting is universal, and 
nearly invisible: the state permits biological parents to be the default 
caregivers for their infant children—an outcome that is intuitive but 
not inevitable.283 It secures for the young, at minimal administrative 
cost to the state, care provided by those most likely to be committed 
to their well-being.284 While the state acts as caregiver of last resort, 
it lacks the capacity to be children’s default caregiver. It also lacks the 
resources and the capacity to identify an “ideal” caregiver for each 
child, if such a person exists. 
Strong parental deference should continue into infancy and 
childhood. Noninterference allows parents to share the values and 
conception of the good life that will permeate their children’s 
 
 282. For discussions of spiritual treatment exemptions to child abuse statutes, see Jennifer 
L. Hartsell, Mother May I . . . Live?: Parental Refusal of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment for 
Children Based on Religious Objections, 66 TENN. L. REV. 499 (1999); Jennifer Stanfield, 
Comment, Faith Healing and Religious Treatment Exemptions to Child-Endangerment Laws: 
Should Parents Be Allowed to Refuse Necessary Medical Treatment for Their Children Based on 
Their Religious Beliefs?, 22 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 45 (2000). 
 283. See, e.g., June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind?: Redefining the Parent-
Child Relationship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1011, 1069 
(2003). Carbone and Cahn argued that biological ties are important, but so are relationships; 
thus, “once two parents are established on the basis of biology or acknowledgment at the 
child’s birth, their parental status cannot be challenged or changed without consideration of 
the child’s interests, which will ordinarily be presumed to lie with the continuation of the 
relationship.” Id. 
 284. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 
2401, 2432–33 (1995) (arguing that biological bonds, affective bonds, and informal social 
norms all operate as extralegal influences that reinforce parental commitment). 
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formative years.285 And though it may seem counterintuitive, in some 
ways noninterference in parenting decisions may be the best way to 
advance children’s welfare interests during this time. Emily Buss is 
among those scholars who argue that noninterference more generally 
may lead to better parenting overall.286 Buss argues first, parents are 
“child-specific expert[s]” and are generally better qualified than state 
actors to assess and meet their individual children’s needs. Second, 
parents who make unimpeded childrearing decisions may find 
childrearing more fulfilling; this may increase their enjoyment of and 
commitment to the task, which in turn can make them better 
parents.287 Finally, even when parents are less competent than is 
ideal, state intrusion and oversight create disruptions that might 
undermine the struggling parents’ effectiveness further. Thus 
noninterference, even in cases of less-than-optimal parenting, can 
better serve children’s interests.288 
A final justification for adopting a policy of parental deference 
during this stage is more frankly pragmatic. Maximizing parental 
deference in their children’s early lives may make parents somewhat 
more inclined to accept a greater level of interference in adolescence. 
During that equally crucial period, the state should universally 
require certain educational experiences—in particular, out-of-home 
comprehensive secondary education—that many parents who wish to 
shield their children from certain experiences will resist.289 
 
 285. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the “parental direction of the religious 
upbringing and education of their children in their early and formative years have a high place 
in our society.” Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1972) (discussing implications of 
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1924)) (additional citations omitted). This 
freedom to live out and instill in their children their values also furthers the value of pluralism. 
 286. Buss, Adrift in the Middle, supra note 134, at 287–96.; see also JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN 
ET AL., supra note 91, at 7–8 (“[P]reference for minimum state intervention and for leaving 
well enough alone . . . [since] law is incapable of effectively managing, except in a very gross 
sense, so delicate and complex a relationship as that between parent and child.”); Gilles, supra 
note 88, at 937. 
 287. Buss, Child Development Research, supra note 273, at 288–89. 
 288. Id. at 290–91. Buss acknowledges the general lack of social science research 
supporting these contentions, but observes that the difficulty of empirical research renders this 
a state of affairs unlikely to change. Id. at 298–99. She thus proposes that the state should 
interfere only in cases involving the sorts of “severe and ascertainable harm[s]” to children that 
fall within the state’s special competence. Id. at 289. The state’s relative competence, Buss 
argues, is greatest where the alleged harm relates to the child’s development as a public citizen 
and where there is a “broad consensus” about the harm. Id. 
 289. See infra Part V.D.1. 
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In what ways would maximum parental deference differ from 
current policy? First, the state might give parents greater control over 
their children’s education, even in the public schools. Currently, 
parents who wish to enroll their children in public schools yet 
exempt them from certain aspects of the curriculum are 
presumptively unable to do so.290 Parental deference could reverse 
this presumption. Second, state agencies that enforce child 
protection laws might develop protocols, particularly in situations of 
potential neglect, that minimize the more obvious and physical 
manifestations of interference. 
Exceptions to a policy of parental deference would remain, and 
the state would retain and exercise authority necessary to preserve 
the current and future liberties of the immature. Presumptive 
parental deference would not preclude, for example, laws such as 
those protecting children from abuse or neglect, or denying parents 
the ability to withhold medical treatment from their critically ill 
children. 
Another exception, of sorts, to a general presumption of 
noninterference grows out of the overwhelming evidence 
demonstrating the importance of basic educational experiences 
beginning in infancy. In light of this evidence, the state should 
continue or increase its efforts to ensure that infants and young 
children receive early experiences necessary for optimal cognitive 
development. Programs such as Head Start and Early Head Start 
recognize the importance of this period. Since their creation, its 
importance has become all the clearer. The federal government could 
expand these efforts and support others. For example, it may provide 
funding for states to widely disseminate and promote educational 
materials on the importance of early childhood learning (perhaps in 
hospitals and birthing centers, targeted to parents who claim child 
dependents on state tax forms, etc.). 
Despite the importance of early experience to subsequent 
development, it is arguably unnecessary for states to require early 
education or other mandatory programs. The sorts of experiences 
that benefit young children’s development tend to consist of 
activities that are well within the abilities of the average parent (e.g., 
engaging the very young in conversation, reading, singing, etc.), that 
 
 290. See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1058 (6th Cir. 
1987). 
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are not dependent on specific curricular content, and that are thus 
unlikely to be opposed by many parents.291 
2. Overcoming objections 
The concept of strong parental rights is something of an 
embarrassment—or at least an enigma—in the liberal constitutional 
democracy. Their dependency alone, the argument goes, does not 
justify vesting in others a “right” over the lives of the young. James 
Dwyer has critiqued what he calls this “paradox” in the state’s 
conception of personal liberty. Dwyer argues that vesting in parents a 
“right” over their children is inconsistent with the state’s core legal 
and moral principles.292 He points out that constitutional protection 
for parents’ decisions “regarding children’s education and 
upbringing are actually a form of ‘other-determination.’”293 Parental 
rights are thus a singular anomaly in a constitutional jurisprudence 
that otherwise limits rights to self-determining individual choices and 
activities.294 
Others also criticize the use of “rights-talk” with respect to 
family life. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse resists the notion of parental 
rights due to its tendency to elide the primary concept—parental 
responsibility—that provides some justification for parents’ power.295 
 
 291. Knudsen et al., supra note 170. One non-profit in a Mississippi community, for 
example, works to improve young children’s development and readiness for kindergarten by 
targeting their parents. It offers low-income parents weekly sessions aimed at exposing them to 
developmentally appropriate ways of enhancing their children’s education. Through a 
curriculum grounded in accepted research on early childhood cognitive and linguistic 
development, parents learn the significance of activities including: (1) engaging their young 
children in active conversations about their immediate environment; (2) involving children in 
ordinary activities (like folding laundry) and using those activities as educational vehicles (“the 
shirt has three buttons”); and (3) singing and reading to their children. See BabySteps: 
Empowering Parents, Program Components, http://www.takebabysteps.com/ 
program_components.htm#Auxiliary_Program_Components (last visited Nov. 10, 2010). See 
also DIV. OF BEHAVIORAL AND SOC. SCIENCES AND EDUC., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL & 
NAT’L ACADS., EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT AND LEARNING: NEW KNOWLEDGE FOR 
POLICY (2001). 
 292. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare, supra note 89, at 1410. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. at 1373, 1406–11. 
 295. Woodhouse, supra note 84, at 1818; see also Janet L. Dolgin, The Constitution as 
Family Arbiter: A Moral in the Mess?, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 337 (2002) (arguing that a 
constitutional jurisprudence grounded in individual, autonomy-based rights is poorly suited to 
resolving questions of family relationships); see also Bartlett, supra note 85, at 298 (identifying 
and objecting to the view that parenthood is an entitlement that follows the acceptance of 
parental responsibility). 
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Mary Ann Glendon has argued more generally that emphasizing 
rights fosters self-interest instead of connection and nurturing, and is 
thus particularly inapt in the context of families.296 
One must concede the validity of these critiques. In particular, a 
parent’s deeply felt desire to influence one’s children ought not—
again, especially in the liberal state—create an entitlement to control 
one’s children’s lives. 
On the other hand, no right is absolute, and as discussed above, 
the parental right is a particularly squishy one.297 The fact that 
parents’ rights tend to be fundamentally protected in rhetoric only, 
moreover, mitigates their potential harm.298 States regularly intrude 
on these rights, and so long as their intrusion stops short of 
threatening the existence of the parent-child relationship and does 
not infringe other constitutionally protected rights, the Supreme 
Court all but looks the other way.299 Myriad health, safety, and 
educational regulations that constrict parents’ rights are a testament 
to this. Viewed in this light, the “parental right” could more 
accurately be characterized a “parental presumption.”300 
There is a third factor that may assuage some of the concerns 
raised above. As it stands, parental rights implicitly recede to some 
degree as children’s autonomy grows. This recession is consistent 
with both constitutional and liberal arguments for individual rights. 
The next Part argues that it should happen in a more systematic and 
explicit way. 
 
 296. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS-TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE 9–15 (1991). See generally Gretchen Ritter, Women’s Civic Inclusion and the Bill of 
Rights, in GENDER EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN’S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 60, 81–82 
(Linda C. McClain & Joanna L. Grossman, eds. 2009) (discussing the shortcoming of rights-
based models of equality and arguing “that the republican vision of popular sovereignty 
expressed in the Bill [of Rights can support] . . . a more inclusive notion of equality and 
citizenship that draws on women’s experiences in their families and communities as well as 
their interests as autonomous individuals,” and rejecting a politics “based on a stripped-down 
liberal individualism” in favor of one that addresses the “social embeddedness and community 
values [that] shape us all.”) 
 297. See supra Part III.B 
 298. See id. 
 299. As discussed above, constitutional doctrine allows states broad authority to exercise 
their parens patriae and police powers to enact legislation aimed at furthering societal interests 
and securing children’s welfare. See supra Part III.B. 
 300. Given the importance of language itself to beliefs and attitudes, we might do well to 
abandon the language of rights when discussing the parent-child relationship. It is perhaps 
preferable to speak of “parental deference,” or as suggested by Dwyer, a “parental privilege.” 
Dwyer, supra note 70, at 1410. 
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D. Policies—Adolescence and Emerging Adulthood 
Perhaps more so than in infancy and childhood, existing policies 
affecting adolescents and emerging adults fail this group of citizens. 
The continuing extent of parental deference, especially over 
adolescents’ education, allows parents who choose to do so to 
deprive their children of the experience and knowledge they must 
gain if they are to have the eventual capacity to decide their own 
lives. 
This Part thus suggests a simple yet far-reaching policy that 
follows, and complements, that proposed for infancy and 
childhood—obligatory out-of-home comprehensive education. 
Though such a requirement would have been regarded as 
unremarkable in the 1980s, it may be seen as radical today. But as 
Part V.D.1 argues, this policy is necessary to reliably ensure that the 
immature receive the basic experiences and education necessary to 
develop the capacities to determine their own life courses and 
participate in the economic, political, and social life of the state. If 
successful, these policies achieve the state’s third and fourth ends—
safeguarding immature citizens’ future liberty and ensuring the 
citizenry’s ability to perform functions essential to the state’s 
preservation. If, after having developed these basic capacities, the 
now-mature citizen chooses a life of civic and social disengagement 
or voluntarily submits to the authority of others, the state will have 
nonetheless increased the likelihood that the citizen’s life course was 
the product of choice. Part V.D.2 anticipates and addresses 
objections to this proposal. 
Next, Part V.D.3 urges that state decision making become more 
cognizant of and responsive to the capacities of its developing 
citizens. State actors should work to ensure that adolescents have the 
liberty to make those self-regarding decisions of which they are 
capable. These are age- and context-specific liberties. The science of 
development should inform the state’s decisions as to which liberties 
may be appropriate, allowing decision-makers to make some general 
determinations about the development of various capacities. But 
science cannot prescribe policy, and decision makers must also 
consider other factors—including the possibility and potential 
negative externalities of adolescents’ bad choices. 
In general, by mid-adolescence the young should receive 
authority to make for themselves those decisions which can be 
evaluated in a deliberate and considered manner, made outside the 
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presence or influence of peers, and which if mistaken, are nonetheless 
unlikely to cause significant negative externalities. By taking this 
approach to decision making, the state would better meet its 
obligation to ensure the basic liberty of the immature; because in 
these contexts, adolescents are in fact mature. 
To illustrate, this Part suggests two decision-making contexts 
that it argues reliably fall within the competence of adolescents by 
ages fifteen or sixteen and meet the criteria outlined above: self-
regarding health decisions generally—which many state decisions 
already recognize; and voting—which they do not. 
Finally, Part V.D.4 cautions that adolescents, emerging adults, 
and the public should receive protection from young individuals’ 
ongoing deficiencies. These policies recognize that there are other 
contexts that predictably hinder the decision making of young 
people, such as those where they must make quick decisions under 
pressure. Where the immature are likely to make poor decisions, and 
especially where poor decisions risk serious harm to themselves or 
others, the state should constrain their decision-making abilities. 
This caution furthers the state’s third end—safeguarding immature 
citizens’ future liberty (by increasing the likelihood that they will in 
fact be around to enjoy their future liberty)—and also the state’s 
broader obligation to safeguard the liberty of all its citizens. It 
should thus act to safeguard both the immature—and in some of 
these contexts, individuals who have technically reached the age of 
majority but continue nonetheless to be immature—and citizenry 
generally from their cognitive deficiencies. Again to illustrate, this 
Part suggests contexts that arguably meet these criteria: driving, 
alcohol consumption, and combat-related aspects of military service. 
1. Out-of-home comprehensive secondary education 
States should make out-of-home comprehensive secondary 
education obligatory and require attendance through ages seventeen 
or eighteen. 
The state must endeavor to safeguard future citizens’ basic 
liberty.301 Liberty at a minimum entails making one’s significant life 
choices. Yet individuals who choose a life course without knowing 
the alternatives available to them make no choice at all. Rather, they 
are channeled into a life course that is consistent with others’, 
 
 301. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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typically their parents’, values and beliefs. Because their resulting life 
paths express others’ wills rather than their own, these future citizens 
are denied the basic liberty that is their minimum entitlement. 
Meaningful choice also requires a reasonable ability to avail 
oneself of various alternatives. Comprehensive education thus 
ensures not only that the young are exposed to the different choices 
available to them in modern society, but also that they are reasonably 
prepared to take advantage of them. 
Comprehensive secondary education serves another, liberty-
maximizing purpose. In addition to revealing and preserving 
opportunities, rich secondary education can provide the experiences 
necessary to individuals’ achieving their cognitive potential. Research 
indicates that experience is an important input in the rapid-
development period in which adolescents develop adult-level mental 
skills.302 Experience leads to improved cognitive abilities, which 
endure throughout individuals’ life and may better position them to 
elect various alternatives, such as postsecondary education. 
Comprehensive secondary education may thus help individuals 
realize their innate potential to pursue and excel in a variety of 
pursuits or occupations. 
Research suggests that the sensitive periods during which the 
brain’s development is most responsive to education and experience 
have largely ended by late adolescence and early adulthood. It is thus 
possible that delaying experience to late adolescence or adulthood, 
after the conclusion of these experience-dependent sensitive periods, 
may result in adolescents’ failure to fully develop their cognitive 
potential.303 A comprehensive education is thus vital for cognitive 
development. 
School curricula must be substantively comprehensive to support 
development and preserve citizens’ future liberty. But education 
relates to the state’s secondary end as well—a citizenry with the 
capacity to contribute to the state’s continued functioning. In 
general, the education required to ensure a self-sufficient and 
productive citizenry overlaps with that required to preserve 
individual choice over one’s life. Educating the young for civic and 
political participation, however, potentially involves transmitting 
values that can make this aspect of education more contentious still. 
 
 302. See Arnett, supra note 164 and accompanying text; supra Part IV.C.2–3. 
 303. See supra Part IV.C.2–3. 
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Political theorists vigorously debate the sort of civic education 
that young citizens in the liberal democratic state ought to receive. 
Amy Gutmann has argued that perpetuating the liberal state requires 
a robust “democratic education,” which includes instilling in the 
young those values conducive to society’s flourishing. She thus 
supports teaching tolerance for opposing views and the skills 
necessary for rational deliberation so that immature citizens may 
critically evaluate different ways of life.304 Michael McConnell 
counters that “the new ideal of the liberal citizen [espoused by 
Gutmann] seems to conflict with the ideal believer in religion” and 
further maintains that “[w]hen government comes to insist that all 
citizens should be neutral, tolerant, and egalitarian, it ceases to be a 
liberal government.”305 Bruce Ackerman also resists instilling in the 
young a robust vision of liberal values, insisting instead that 
education in the liberal state must itself aim for neutrality in order to 
ensure citizens’ free choice.306 
It is unnecessary here to weigh in on this vexing debate. To 
achieve the state’s minimum end, the civic education provided to 
students must merely ensure their capacity for civic participation. It 
may indeed be that endeavoring to instill in them certain values and 
a greater inclination toward civic participation would be a more 
successful policy. But the focus here is the minimum required by the 
state of its citizenry. The young should thus learn what it is the 
liberal democratic state requires of its citizenry generally in order for 
its continued functioning, and they should learn those skills 
necessary to meet those requirements.307 
 
 304. AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 41–47 (1st prtg., rev. ed., 1999). 
 305. Michael W. McConnell, Old Liberalism, New Liberalism, and People of Faith, in 
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 5, 17–20 (Michael W. McConnell et al., eds., 
2001). 
 306. BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 139–411 (1980). 
 307. This proposal echoes that of William Galston, who argues that children should 
receive a basic civic education but would stop short of instilling in them other liberal values 
such as respect for diversity or rational evaluation of different ways of life. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. 
GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE 
247–52 (1991). It is even less extensive, however; than Galston’s “basic civic education,” 
which would include “child[ren]’s acquisition of . . . the beliefs and habits that support the 
polity.” Id. at 252. The proposal here would educate children about the “beliefs and habits 
that support the polity” without insisting upon their acquisition. It is likely, however, that 
those parents who would resist the state’s actively instilling these values in their children would 
similarly resist their exposure to them at all. See supra Part III.C. (arguing that parents’ access 
to and influence over their children can give them the ability to thwart state goals with respect 
to their education, etc.). 
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The distinction between instilling in the young certain civic 
values and exposing them to the civic participation required of the 
democratic state’s citizenry is arguably subtle, and it is perhaps that 
those who parents would oppose the former would also oppose the 
latter. There will be parents who hold certain religious or cultural 
beliefs—like the Amish in Yoder—who would resist education geared 
toward participation in civic life (the Amish, of course also resisted 
education geared toward participation in modern society). The 
Supreme Court held in Yoder that when such resistance is grounded 
in religious belief, it must be respected.308 This is a mistake, and 
Yoder should be reconsidered. The state cannot coerce its young 
citizens to embrace modern society or participate in civic life. But to 
deny them basic education tends toward foreordaining their futures 
and unacceptably narrows their options. If in the end, citizens wish 
to remain in Amish or other isolated communities and withdraw 
from broader civic life, they may certainly do so. But the choice must 
be a real one, and it must be theirs to make. 
Other parents, in particular those with conservative or 
fundamentalist religious views, may resist other aspects of 
comprehensive education. They may argue that exposure to certain 
knowledge and values is itself antithetical to their religious or 
cultural beliefs. Be that as it may, they ought not be permitted to 
prevent their adolescent children from receiving a comprehensive 
education. Despite this constraint on their authority, parents’ 
interests in this aspect of childrearing are nonetheless adequately 
protected, for the following two reasons: 
First, as proposed in the previous Part, the state can entitle 
parents to near-absolute control over their infants and younger 
children.309 Parents may thus immerse their children in their value 
systems and religious beliefs during the early formative period in 
children’s lives. And nothing, of course, would prevent parents from 
continuing to educate and transmit their values to their children at 
home and through extracurricular programs. 
 
 308. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 309. See supra Part V.C.1. While it may be ideal, from a child development perspective, 
to ensure that all young children receive optimal educational experiences, the state may 
reasonably choose to protect children’s welfare and advance its ultimate ends by allowing 
parents to determine children’s first experiences, with the benefit of information on the 
importance of early education. Id. 
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Second, their high-school-aged children have attained cognitive 
abilities substantially the same as those of their parents to 
comprehend at an abstract level the dissonances between their home 
education and values and their “public” education.310 The 
significance of this can be illustrated by the well-known litigation of 
Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, in which 
fundamentalist Christian parents challenged a public school’s refusal 
to excuse their children from a reading program that presented 
values and beliefs that differed from their own.311 Among the 
parents’ objections to the reading series were that reading the texts 
would confuse their children, stunt the development of their reading 
skills by presenting them with views with which they disagreed, and 
unleash their imaginations when they ought to be bounded.312 The 
parents themselves, however, could read the books without suffering 
these harms—as Nomi Stolzenberg observed, the “parents’ faith was 
taken to be unshakable; only the children were thought to be at 
risk.”313 The Sixth Circuit rejected the parents’ objections and held 
that “mere exposure” to ideas did not violate the children’s, or their 
parents’, free exercise of religion.314 
The schoolchildren in Mozert were in the first through eighth 
grades. Under the policies suggested here, the state would have 
presumptively deferred to the parents’ desire to enroll their children 
in public school yet exempt them from exposure to the objectionable 
readers.315 But if parents of high-school-aged children raised the 
 
 310. See supra Part IV.C.2. 
 311. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988). 
 312. Id. See also, Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, “He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out”: 
Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581, 
599 (1993) (summarizing the claims made by plaintiffs in Mozert). 
 313. Id. 
 314. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1065. 
 315. Currently, parents who elect to enroll their children in public schools may exercise 
only limited control over the education provided their children in that setting. See, e.g., Baker 
v. Owen, 423 U.S. 907 (1975), aff’g 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975) (regarding method 
of disciplining student); Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1–L, 135 F.3d 694 (10th 
Cir. 1998) (regarding ability of homeschooled student to attend public school part-time); 
Immediato v. Rye Neck School Dist., 73 F.3d 454 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 813 
(1996) (regarding mandatory community service for student); Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer 
Prod., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1159 (1996) (regarding mandatory 
sex education presentation); Fleischfresser v. Dirs. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 
1994) (regarding content of assigned reading); Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 
F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988) (same); Eric A. DeGroff, 
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same objection, the presumption would be reversed. This is because 
developmental research indicates that older children are no more 
likely than their parents to be confused or stunted by exposure to 
teachings that contradict lessons learned at home, whereas such 
exposure might very well confuse a younger child.316 
Finally, the state should insist that adolescents’ secondary 
education should occur in schools outside the home, also for two 
reasons: First, it is doubtful that parents who themselves reject 
exposure to certain knowledge will effectively transmit that very 
information to their children. Second, homeschooling makes it 
possible to deny children exposure to different ideas and unlike 
peers, which researchers have found to be a key contributor to 
adolescent identity development, ability to grapple with different 
perspectives, and capacity to develop autonomous choice.317 
As of the early 1980s, homeschooling was prohibited in most 
states. It is now legal in all of them.318 Most parents who choose to 
homeschool their children do so for religious reasons.319 These 
parents generally seek to instill in their children certain religious and 
social values, and to shield them from incompatible secular values.320 
Parents homeschool more than one million children, and the 
number of children homeschooled has been growing at a rate of ten 
to twenty percent per year.321 Despite the increasing number of 
children educated at home, homeschooling regulation has become 
 
Parental Rights and Public School Curricula: Revisiting Mozert After 20 Years, 38 J.L. & 
EDUC. 83, 104–05 (2009). 
 316. See supra Part IV.C.2–3. 
 317. Emily Buss, The Adolescent’s Stake in the Allocation of Educational Control Between 
Parent and State, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1234 (2000). 
 318. Kimberly A. Yuracko, Education Off the Grid: Constitutional Restraints on 
Homeschooling, 96 CAL. L. REV. 123, 124 (2008). 
 319. Id. at 127. 
 320. Id. Many conservative Christian parents who homeschool their children reject what 
they view to be relativistic moral standards, disapproving, for example, both homosexuality and 
premarital sex. Id. 
 321. See PATRICIA M. LINES, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., HOMESCHOOLERS: ESTIMATING 
NUMBERS AND GROWTH 1 (web ed. 1999), http://www.ed.gov/offices/OERI/SAI/ 
homeschool/homeschoolers.pdf. Lines explains that the number of homeschooled children 
may be much higher, but that it is difficult to estimate accurately. Many states do not require 
parents to register their intention to homeschool, and many parents in states that do impose 
such requirements nonetheless fail to comply with them. Id. at 2–3; see also Patricia M. Lines, 
Homeschooling Comes of Age, 140 PUB. INT. 74 (2000). 
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increasingly lax, and half of all states require no standardized 
evaluation of homeschooled children.322 
The right to homeschool, and to a lesser degree to enroll their 
children in all manner of private schools, grants parents considerable 
power to shape the outcome of their children’s lives. By permitting 
parents such categorical control over the entire course of their 
children’s primary and secondary educations, however, the state 
abdicates its fundamental obligation to safeguard their liberty, both 
as current and future citizens. The state also fails to advance its end 
of ensuring that the young will have attained the capacities required 
to meet the obligations of mature citizens. 
Allowing parents who would prefer homeschooling the option of 
enrolling their children in religious or other private schools might 
constitute an acceptable compromise, because the state is better able 
to ensure the adequacy of curricular content than when children are 
educated at home.323 Some religious schools may resist adopting 
aspects of a comprehensive educational curricula; but public 
oversight could minimize and address this sort of resistance. 
Religious schools may share other shortcomings of homeschooling. 
While they expose children to peers, they are likely to attract a more 
homogenous community that shares religious beliefs and social 
values; thus, children in religious schools may lose out on the 
developmental benefits of exposure to unlike peers. 
 
 322. Just twenty-five states require standardized evaluation of homeschooled children, 
and ten states do not even require that parents who homeschool their children register their 
intentions. Yuracko, supra note 254, at 129. Mississippi, for example, has essentially 
deregulated homeschooling altogether. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-13-91(9) (2009). Other 
states impose more specific regulatory schemes, including: requiring school board approval of 
home education programs; imposing teaching qualifications; requiring standardized testing; 
and establishing oversight by certified teachers. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20A, § 
5001-A(3)(A); N.D. CENT. CODE. ANN. §§ 15.1-23-03 to -09 (2009). 
 323. States have the power to regulate private schools. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 
160, 178 (1976). See also supra Part III.B.3. They should oversee the quality of the education 
through constitutionally permissible oversight. Courts have held to be within constitutional 
limits state regulations requiring standardized testing and requiring that teachers in private, as 
well as public schools, receive state certification. See, e.g., Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039 
(8th Cir. 1988) (requiring all children to take standardized tests); Fellowship Baptist Church v. 
Benton, 815 F.2d 485, 495 (8th Cir. 1987) (requiring private school students to be taught by 
certified teachers). 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2010 2:07:23 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
1136 
2. Autonomy rights 
Upon reaching eighteen, individuals acquire virtually all of the 
legal rights of citizenship—the right to make medical decisions, enter 
into binding contracts, vote, etc.324 But despite the existence of this 
categorical age of majority, there are numerous contexts where law 
and policy recognize the decisional capacities of those who are still 
minors.325 Given the importance of individual liberty, this Part simply 
urges state decision makers to consider recognizing their capacities in 
other, appropriate contexts. 
In general, the young should receive those liberties that they 
have the capacity to exercise competently.326 Put another way, in 
those contexts where they have achieved decision-making 
competence, they should correspondingly have decisional 
autonomy.327 The reason for this should be obvious: where one has 
gained the capacity to make a decision affecting one’s life, the 
justification for allocating to another the entitlement to make that 
decision disappears. Cognitive scientists have emphasized the 
importance of identifying the contexts where the young have—and 
have not—achieved such competence.328 As one behavioral decision 
researcher has noted: 
 
 324. See, e.g., Scott, Legal Construction of Adolescence, supra note 164, at 559 
(cataloguing rights attained upon reaching age of majority). 
 325. J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Shifting Boundaries: Abortion, Criminal Culpability and the 
Indeterminate Legal Status of Adolescents, 18 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 80 (2003) (“[C]hildhood 
ends at different ages in different contexts.”). In tort law, for example, adolescents may be held 
liable under negligence and intentional tort theories. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 134 (5th ed. 1984); see also Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Grim, 440 P.2d 621, 626 (Kan. 1968) (holding minor tortfeasors liable for damages caused by 
negligence); Redd v. Bohannon, 166 So. 2d 362, 365 (La. Ct. App. 1964) (stating that 
minority is not a defense to tort liability for negligence); Queens Ins. Co. v. Hammond, 132 
N.W.2d 792, 793 (Mich. 1965) (finding that minors as young as seven years old may be liable 
for both negligence and intentional torts). Courts apply a subjective variable standard of care 
rather than the objective reasonable person standard. 
 326. See supra Part IV.C.2–3. 
 327. Assessing decisions is itself a complicated business. Behavioral decision researchers 
note that assessing decision-making competence involves normative analysis—namely, first 
identifying the choice that a rational actor would make in light of individual values and goals. 
These values, of course, differ among individuals and can lead them to reach different 
decisions. Thus, while an adult might disapprove of an adolescent’s decision, that decision 
might be rational in is the sense of being consistent with the adolescent’s values or goals. 
Researchers thus also assess individuals’ values—whether individuals’ values correspond to 
externally prescribed values, and whether they are internally consistent across choices. See 
Baruch Fischhoff, Assessing Adolescent Decision-Making Competence, 28 DEV. REV. 12 (2008). 
 328. E.g., Fischhoff, supra note 327. 
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High stakes ride on society’s ability to assess adolescents’ decision-
making competence. If that competence is overestimated, then 
teens will face choices that are too difficult for them. If it is 
underestimated, then they will be kept from exercising warranted 
independence. If teens believe that the boundaries of their 
autonomy have been drawn wrongly, then they may feel unfairly 
restricted or unfairly left to fend for themselves.329 
In light of both individual and situational, or context-specific, 
variability, researchers who study decision making cannot identify 
with precision every context where developmentally-normal citizens 
have decision-making competence.330 But researchers have made two 
critical findings: first, by mid-adolescence, individuals have the 
cognitive capacity to make competent decisions; and second, certain 
situations and factors reliably hinder the decision-making abilities 
that adolescents otherwise possess.331 
As a general rule, then, law should presume adolescent decision-
making competence,332 with certain important qualifications: First, 
the presumption should not apply to contexts where their 
performance is likely to be compromised. Second, the presumption 
should apply most strongly to those contexts where the adolescent’s 
decision intimately affects the adolescent only, and least strongly 
where the risk is high of negative externalities stemming from a bad 
decision. 
Two examples of contexts where adolescents should receive 
decision-making autonomy follow. 
a. Health care decisions. In general, research suggests that 
adolescents capably make decisions in those contexts where they can 
engage in considered deliberation and where peer pressure is less 
likely to play a defining role. Medical decision making, according to 
some developmental psychologists, falls within this category, where 
“health care practitioners can provide information and encourage 
 
 329. Id. at 12. 
 330. Id. at 13. 
 331. See supra Part IV.C. 
 332. See Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum, 
51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1269 (2000) (arguing in favor of a “legal framework predicated on 
adolescent decisional ability” as consistent with contemporary social norms and as a remedy to 
current inconsistencies in treatment of adolescents). 
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adolescents to think through their decisions before acting.”333 
Empirical studies support this conclusion. 
Studies of adolescent medical decision making have found that, 
by age fourteen, adolescents generally wish to participate actively in 
and make decisions affecting their health care.334 They have the 
ability to understand their options and evaluate the services offered 
them, and they exhibit mature decision making with respect to 
these.335 In other studies, researchers have concluded that 
adolescents age fifteen or sixteen and above do not significantly 
differ from adults in their competence to consent to medical 
treatment.336 
While adolescent decision making tends to suffer in stressful or 
unfamiliar situations, studies have found that adolescents capably 
make decisions affecting their health care even under less-than-ideal 
conditions. Researchers analyzed the decision-making processes of 
adolescent girls confronted with unintentional pregnancies, for 
example, and found that those aged “fourteen to seventeen appear to 
be similar to legal adults in both cognitive competence and 
volition . . . [and] remain competent decision makers when facing an 
emotionally challenging real world decision.”337 
Many existing policies already reflect this area of adolescent 
competence and appropriately balance their interests in making 
decisions affecting their lives against the continuing importance of 
parental involvement. While default rules governing the right to 
consent to or refuse medical treatment usually presume the 
decisional incapacity of minors, many create exceptions for “mature 
 
 333. Steinberg et al., Less Mature Than Adults?, supra note 167, at 592. 
 334. Kenneth R. Ginsburg et al., Adolescents’ Perceptions of Factors Affecting Their 
Decisions to Seek Health Care, 273 J.A.M.A. 1913, 1918 (1995); Bruce Ambuel & Julian 
Rappaport, Developmental Trends in Adolescents’ Psychological and Legal Competence to Consent 
to Abortion, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 129 (1992); Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, 
The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD 
DEV. 1589, 1595–96 (1982). 
 335. Bruce Ambuel & Julian Rappaport, Developmental Trends in Adolescents’ 
Psychological and Legal Competence to Consent to Abortion, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 129 
(1992); Kenneth R. Ginsburg et al., Adolescents’ Perceptions of Factors Affecting Their Decisions 
to Seek Health Care, 273 JAMA 1913, 1918 (1995); Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, 
The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD 
DEV. 1589, 1595–96 (1982). 
 336. Weithorn & Campbell, infra note 334, at 1595. 
 337. Ambuel & Rappaport, infra note 334, at 148. See also Ehrlich, supra note 325, at 
93 (2003) (summarizing studies). 
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minors.”338 These statutory provisions permit minors found to be 
mature to decide the course of their health care treatment (although 
some give mature minors only the right to consent to, but not 
refuse, treatment).339 
Along the same lines, the Supreme Court has held that states 
may not impose parental consent requirements on adolescents 
seeking abortions, unless those requirements contain bypass 
procedures in which an adolescent may instead opt to have a judge 
assess her decision-making maturity in an individualized hearing.340 
Minors deemed sufficiently mature may thus consent to abortion 
procedures without first notifying their parents.341 Numerous states, 
moreover, have gone further, declaring that adolescents have an 
absolute right to consent to abortion procedures.342 
Medical decisions intimately concern adolescents’ lives. To the 
extent that negative externalities result from their choices (as in the 
spread of sexually transmitted diseases), these are more likely to 
occur when adolescents are denied decisional autonomy.343 Policies 
that explicitly permit adolescents to obtain medical treatment for 
sexually transmitted diseases without parental notification or consent 
not only recognize adolescents’ decision-making competence in this 
sphere but also arguably prevent negative externalities by making it 
more likely that adolescents will seek treatment. 
Given evidence that by mid-adolescence they have the capacity to 
make mature decisions about their health care,344 applying the 
doctrine of presumed incapacity to these teens denies them 
decisional autonomy with insufficient justification. 
 
 338. See Hartman, supra note 332, at 1308–10. 
 339. See id. at 1311. 
 340. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 
(1992). See also, e.g., Zbaraz v. Madigan, 572 F.3d 370 (7th Cir. 2009) (upholding as 
constitutional parental notification statute providing for judicial bypass for mature minors or 
minors whose best interests would not be served by notification). See also, supra Part IV.B 
(discussing the constitutional rights of minors). 
 341. Casey, 505 U.S. at 899. 
 342. See, e.g., Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 818–19, 831 (Cal. 
1997); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193–96 (Fla. 1989). 
 343. Joshua A. Douglas, When Is a “Minor” Also an “Adult”?: An Adolescent’s Liberty 
Interest in Accessing Contraceptives from Public School Distribution Programs, 43 WILLAMETTE 
L. REV. 545 (2007). 
 344. See supra notes 335–37, and accompanying text; supra Part IV.2.3. 
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b. Voting. Voting also involves the sort of considered decision 
making that is within the competence of individuals by mid-
adolescence. Elections unfold over a period of time, giving voters the 
opportunity to deliberate and evaluate options without undue 
pressure. Voting itself is done anonymously and in private, which 
diminishes concern that adolescents’ choices will be unduly 
influenced by peers. And since voters self-select, taking the time and 
initiative to register, travel to a polling place, etc., it is likely that 
those adolescents who would exercise the right would not do so 
frivolously. 
Voting, moreover, is a core right of citizenship and the means by 
which citizens in a democracy limit the power of the state, guarantee 
it remains responsive to their interests, and thus ensure their 
continued liberty.345 It is the quintessential civic activity, one that the 
state should encourage. Given its importance, the state should 
withhold the franchise from citizens only when there is a compelling 
justification to do so. If a group of citizens has the capacity to 
exercise this right of citizenship, the state violates principles of 
equality by denying it to them. Extending the franchise to some of 
those younger than eighteen (perhaps mid-adolescents aged sixteen 
and above) also gives greater voice to a historically underrepresented 
category of citizens. 
Many people supported the passage of the Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment on the grounds that eighteen-year-olds were subject to 
being drafted into military service and were also held accountable as 
adults for criminal behavior.346 Since they thus shouldered the 
responsibilities of citizenship, many believed that eighteen-year-olds 
should also receive its rights.347 One might thus anticipate the 
converse argument—that those under eighteen do not shoulder the 
 
 345. Although the constitution only provides explicit protection for voting for 
Congressional representatives, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment prohibits the disenfranchisement 
of those eighteen or older. U.S. CONST. Amend. XXVI, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the 
United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged 
by the United States or by any State on account of age.”). For discussions of the historical 
context surrounding the Amendment’s passage, see Larry Cunningham, A Question of 
Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive and Consistent Vision of Children and Their Status Under 
Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 275, 294–97 (2006); Scott, Legal Construction of 
Adolescence, supra note 164, at 562–64. 
 346. WENDELL W. CULTICE, YOUTH’S BATTLE FOR THE BALLOT: A HISTORY OF 
VOTING AGE IN AMERICA 22–34. 
 347. See Scott, Legal Construction of Adolescence, supra note 164, at 563; Cunningham, 
supra note 345, at 295–96. 
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obligations of citizenship so are not entitled to the right to vote. 
This argument would not withstand scrutiny, however. The right to 
vote is not dependent on one’s meeting other obligations of 
citizenship; instead, it is itself deemed a fundamental obligation, as 
well as a right, of citizenship. 
Thus while the Twenty-Sixth Amendment prohibits states from 
denying those eighteen and over the right to vote, nothing—other 
than lack of political will on the part of older voters—prevents states 
from extending the vote to a broader group of its younger citizens. 
They should begin giving serious consideration to doing so. 
3. Cognitive deficiencies 
In order to safeguard their future liberty, as well as the liberties 
of the citizenry generally, policies should also take account of the 
decision-making deficiencies that characterize adolescence and 
emerging adulthood. States should endeavor to identify contexts 
where their decision making is predictably poor. Among these are 
situations “characterized by high levels of emotional arousal or social 
coercion, or that do not encourage or permit . . . consultation.”348 
With growing evidence the neurobiological bases of risk-taking and 
other behavioral characteristics, efforts to improve adolescents’ 
decision making or reduce their risk taking through education will 
have limited success. Instead, some researchers have simply 
concluded that “until adolescents are able to make better decisions, 
it is important to modify the environments in which they 
develop.”349 In other words, the most (or only) effective approach to 
reducing adolescents’ poor decision making in some contexts is to 
withhold from them altogether decision-making opportunities. This 
means constraining adolescents’ freedoms or extending them 
protections in those real-world contexts where other factors tend to 
confound good decision making. 
One domain in which the state protects adolescents from 
potential consequences of their behavior is the juvenile justice 
system. Developmental scientists and legal scholars have studied 
juvenile crime extensively, including the sorts of decision-making 
deficiencies that tend to make adolescents more susceptible to (and 
 
 348. Steinberg et al., Less Mature Than Adults?, supra note 167, at 592. 
 349. Reyna & Farley, supra note 214, at 34. 
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less culpable for) criminal activity.350 The distinct procedures and 
rehabilitative goals—whether or not these are successfully realized—
of the juvenile court system reflect this understanding. (And given 
the extent to which these have received consideration by judges and 
legislators alike in the criminal context, they will not be the subjects 
of additional focus here.) 
State actors should endeavor to gain understanding, and apply 
that understanding, in broader contexts. Three examples of these 
follow. 
a. Driving. Adolescents’ and emerging adults’ liberties may 
properly be constrained in those domains where their decision-
making abilities remains poor—especially where poor decisions have 
negative externalities, such as potentially causing harm or death to 
the young person or others, or imposing other significant costs. 
Incompetent or irresponsible driving, for example, poses grave risks. 
And adolescents and emerging adults are notoriously bad drivers.351 
Traffic fatalities are the leading cause of death among 
adolescents, accounting for more than one in three of their deaths.352 
Teen drivers aged sixteen to nineteen are four times more likely than 
older drivers to crash, with a crash risk higher than that of any other 
age group.353 And though individuals aged fifteen to twenty-four are 
only fourteen percent of the population in the United States, they 
account for thirty percent of the total cost of motor vehicle injuries 
among males and slightly less—twenty-eight percent—among 
females.354 
All of this is unsurprising, given what is now known about the 
neurobiological aspects of their development and how these likely 
 
 350. See, e.g., SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 173. 
 351. See generally CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, TEEN DRIVERS: 
FACT SHEET (2009), http://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/teen_drivers/teendrivers 
_factsheet.html. 
 352. NATIONAL CENTER FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, CENTERS FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, WEB-BASED INJURY STATISTICS QUERY AND 
REPORTING SYSTEM (WISQARS) (2008) [hereinafter WISQARS], 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/wisqars. 
 353. INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, FATALITY FACTS: TEENAGERS 2005 
(2006), available at http://www.iihs.org/research/fatality_facts_2005/teenagers.html. 
 354. ERIC A. FINKELSTEIN ET AL., INCIDENCE AND ECONOMIC BURDEN OF INJURIES IN 
THE UNITED STATES 139 (2006). The costs of motor vehicle injuries among adolescent boys 
was $19 billion, whereas the total costs of injuries among girls was $7 billion. Id. 
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influence commonly-observed behavioral characteristics.355 Though 
they may have the capacity to learn driving skills and comprehend 
traffic regulations, actual driving situations often demand near-
instant risk-assessment and quick decisions—the sorts of decision-
making contexts that predictably compromise the quality of 
adolescents’ decisions.356 Studies show, for instance, that adolescent 
drivers often underestimate or do not immediately recognize 
hazardous situations.357 Peer influence is also a factor—the crash risk 
for unsupervised drivers increases with the presence of teen 
passengers, with the risk increasing with the number of passengers.358 
Teen driving has thus become a significant public concern, and 
beginning in the mid-1990s many states began taking measures to 
ameliorate the problem.359 One measure that has demonstrated some 
promise is the graduated driver licensing (“GDL”) system. States 
that adopt GDL systems initially extend to new drivers very restricted 
licenses, permitting them to gain driving experience under lower-risk 
conditions.360 GDL systems thus aim to strike a balance between 
 
 355. See supra Part IV.C.2. 
 356. See id. 
 357. B.A. Jonah & N.E. Dawson, Youth and Risk: Age Differences in Risky Driving, Risk 
Perception, and Risk Utility, 3 ALCOHOL, DRUGS AND DRIVING 13 (1987). 
 358. Li-Hui Chen et al., Carrying Passengers as a Risk Factor for Crashes Fatal to 16- and 
17-Year-Old Drivers, 12 JAMA 1578 (2000). See also, Allan F. Williams & Ruth A. Shults, 
Graduated Driver Licensing Research, 2007-Present: A Review and Commentary, 41 J. SAFETY 
RES. 77, 82–83 (2010) (reporting that of all fatal crashes involving sixteen- or seventeen-year-
old drivers in 2008, forty-one percent involved teenaged passengers with no adult in the 
vehicle). See generally Kathryn C. Monahan et al., Affiliation with Antisocial Peers, 
Susceptibility to Peer Influence, and Antisocial Behavior During the Transition to Adulthood, 45 
DEV. PSYCHOL. 1520, 1520 (2009) (noting that “peer pressure has been hypothesized to be 
an important contributor to all sorts of deviant and risky behavior in adolescence, including . . . 
reckless driving.”). 
 359. Williams & Shults, supra note 358 at 77. 
 360. Id. at 83. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.180B (2009); D.C. CODE § 50-
1401.01 (2009). States have imposed various measures, such as curfews, similarly aimed at 
reducing the novice driver’s crash risk. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 12814.6 (2009); MD. 
CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 16-113 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60-4, 120.01 (2009); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:416.1 (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-11 (2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 
56-1-175 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 32-12-12 (2009). See generally INSURANCE 
INSTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, U.S. LICENSING SYSTEMS FOR YOUNG DRIVERS (2009), 
available at http://www.iihs.org/laws/GraduatedLicenseIntro.aspx [hereinafter U.S. 
LICENSING SYSTEMS] (summarizing state graduated driver licensing law); ADVOCATES FOR 
HIGHWAY AND AUTO SAFETY, 2005 ROADMAP TO STATE HIGHWAY SAFETY LAWS 24 (2005); 
Carol L. Jones, Comment, The Unintended Consumer: Protecting Teen Drivers Through 
Graduated Licensing Laws, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 163 (2003) (discussing graduated 
driver licensing systems). 
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respecting the capacities of young people, but also protecting them 
(and society) from their deficiencies. Under the typical GDL system, 
drivers first obtain learners’ permits, which allow them to drive only 
under supervision.361 These permits are followed by provisional 
licenses, which permit unsupervised driving but impose other 
restrictions, such as limits on nighttime driving and prohibitions 
against driving with teenaged passengers in the absence of an 
accompanying adult.362 These restrictions are then lifted as drivers 
gain experience, and when they mature, drivers obtain full 
licensure.363 Restrictions such as those imposed by GDL systems seek 
to strike a balance between respecting the capacities of young people, 
and also protecting them (and society) from their deficiencies. 
GDL systems significantly reduce fatality rates, at least of novice 
drivers subject to supervised driving and other restrictions. One 
study of forty-three U.S. states found that, in those with the most 
comprehensive GDL systems, fatal crash rates for sixteen-year-olds 
were thirty-eight percent lower than in other states.364 Another study 
of U.S. and Canadian GDL systems found a nineteen percent 
reduction in the fatality risk of sixteen-year-old novice drivers.365 
Little evidence to date supports longer-term benefits of GDL 
systems, however; and the evidence gathered so far provides little to 
no support for such benefits. Instead, a number of studies have 
found no crash reduction effect for eighteen-year-olds366 after the 
implementation of GDL programs.367 In California, for example, 
sixteen-year-old fatalities decreased significantly under the state’s 
GDL system, but eighteen-year-old fatalities increased 
significantly.368 Critics of GDL thus argue that the systems reduce 
 
 361. RUTH A. SHULTS ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND 
CONTROL, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, GRADUATED DRIVER 
LICENSING (2006), http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/duip/spotlite/GradDrvLic.htm. 
 362. Allan F. Williams & Ruth A. Shults, Graduated Driver Licensing Research, 2007–
Present: A Review and Commentary, 41 J. SAFETY RES. 77, 79–80 (2010). 
 363. U.S. LICENSING SYSTEMS, supra note 360. 
 364. See WISQARS, supra note 352. 
 365. Ward Vanlaar et al., An Evaluation of Graduated Driver Licensing Programs in 
North America Using a Meta-Analytic Approach, 41 ACCIDENT ANAL. & PREVENTION 1104, 
1107–09 (2009) (reporting study). 
 366. At eighteen, young drivers become automatically entitled to full licensure/exempted 
from GDL requirements in all U.S. states except New Jersey and Maryland, which extend 
GDL requirements beyond eighteen. Williams & Shults, supra note 362, at 79. 
 367. Id. (reporting studies); Vanlaar et al., supra note 365, at 1107–08. 
 368. Williams & Shults, supra note 362, at 78–79. 
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crashes by limiting, not improving, teen driving. Researchers have 
only begun to study the effects of GDL programs, however. It thus 
remains possible that yet-to-be-completed empirical studies will 
contradict or qualify the findings of this first wave of studies. Even if 
they do not, it also remains possible that the systems could be 
improved so as to improve the likelihood of their having long-term 
positive effects. 
Ideally, of course, licensing systems would have both short- and 
long-term effects, reducing crash rates both among novice drivers 
with provisional, restricted licenses, as well as among older 
adolescent and young adult fully-licensed drivers whose driving skills 
will reflect the enduring benefits of their having participated in and 
graduated from a GDL system. If one considers the limited success 
that other education-focused programs have had on reducing 
adolescent risk-taking, however,369 there is little cause for optimism 
in the adolescent-driver context. 
To the extent that their poor driving skills are the result of 
normative developmental characteristics of adolescent decision 
making, it may be the case that the only effective means of reducing 
the crashes and fatalities linked to adolescent driving is to restrict, or 
in some cases, prohibit their driving altogether. Restrictions could 
vary depending on the age and experience of the driver and (like 
some existing restrictions) might include limiting the hours during 
which adolescents may drive, limiting or prohibiting other 
adolescent passengers, prohibiting their driving on highways where 
excessive speeding may be easier (and have more serious and fatal 
results), or raising the driving age altogether. It is unlikely that a 
single model would serve all states equally well, since region-specific 
factors should certainly be accounted for. 
b. Alcohol consumption. Adolescents and emerging adults are 
more likely than those in other age groups to abuse alcohol, and to 
be involved in fatal alcohol-related car crashes. A recent National 
Institutes of Health report found that “[y]oung drivers ages twenty-
one to twenty-four continued to have the highest proportion 
(39.1%) of alcohol involvement among drivers [in alcohol-related 
fatal traffic crashes] in all age groups.”370 Raising the drinking age to 
 
 369. See supra Part IV.C.2–3. 
 370. HSIAO-YE YI ET. AL., NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND 
ALCOHOLISM, TRENDS IN ALCOHOL-RELATED FATAL TRAFFIC CRASHES, UNITED STATES, 
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twenty-one, a condition for state receipt of federal highway funds, 
acknowledges the additional danger that further impairment of 
judgment by alcohol creates for young drivers.371 Indeed, traffic-
related driving fatalities declined when states raised their legal 
drinking ages from eighteen to twenty-one.372 
Given the widespread cultural acceptance of alcohol use among 
adolescents and young adults, however, it is unlikely that raising the 
legal age for its consumption further would be feasible. States must 
consider other approaches to minimizing the most harmful effects of 
adolescent alcohol use. 
Young drivers most dangerous in terms of alcohol involvement 
are those aged twenty-one to twenty-four. It is possible that for 
those aged twenty-four and younger, states should prohibit the 
consumption of alcohol before driving altogether; a young driver 
with any blood alcohol content would be subject to criminal 
sanction. Doing so might help counteract the danger that these 
emerging adults pose to themselves and others. States should also 
consider greater penalties for driving while intoxicated. As with the 
drinking age, the federal spending power would be an appropriate 
tool for implementing measures such as these. 
c. Combat. In all branches of the armed services, seventeen-year-
olds may enlist, with parental consent. Those eighteen and older may 
enlist at will.373 Given their continued deficiencies in decision-
making, still-maturing abilities to assess risk, and inordinate risk-
taking, we may want to reconsider aspects of military service—in 
particular, whether these adolescents and emerging adults have the 
capacity to make good decisions in combat situations. It may be that 
the duties imposed on this group of emerging adults are premature. 
Combat—especially the urban warfare that often characterizes 
modern combat—requires soldiers to make split-second decisions 
under great pressure. These are arguably the sorts of decisions that 
 
1982–2004 (2006), available at http://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/surveillance76/ 
fars04.htm. 
 371. Federal law conditions currently states’ receipt of federal highway funds on their 
imposing a drinking age of twenty-one. 23 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2006). The statute was upheld 
as a valid exercise of Congress’s spending power by the Supreme Court in South Dakota v. 
Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 372. Steinberg, Adolescent Brain Development, supra note 168, at 163. 
 373. See Entrance Requirements FAQ, TODAY’S MILITARY, http://todaysmilitary.com 
/faq/entrance-requirements (last visited Aug. 1, 2009). 
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lie outside their competence. Research suggests, moreover, that 
younger soldiers respond differently than do adults to stress and may 
have increased vulnerability to psychopathology.374 
Although it may not be necessary for the state to exclude young 
soldiers from military service altogether, it may be prudent to 
consider not placing them in these sorts of combat situations until 
they have reached full maturity. More research (or the publication of 
such research) would help decision makers in this context. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Apart from chronological age, the essential characteristic shared 
by the young is neither dependence nor incapacity, but instead 
change—more specifically, the developmental processes through 
which the young develop from immaturity toward maturity. The 
changes wrought by these developmental processes can implicate 
fundamental liberty interests of the young even during their 
immaturity, and the experiences of the young as they develop will 
significantly influence the future citizens they will become. 
Accounting for these changes is the essential challenge faced by the 
state with respect to its immature citizens. 
The approach proposed here is grounded in core principles of 
the liberal democratic state, but it aims to be useful in practice. It 
seeks to provide guidance to decision makers and a measure against 
which they and others might assess the effectiveness of their 
decisions. Adopting it could result in more coherent decision making 
that achieves the ends of the state and better furthers the interests of 
all of its citizens, immature and otherwise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 374. Steinberg, Adolescent Brain Development, supra note 168, at 161. 
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